ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT 



OR, 



FIRST LESSONS IN THE KNOWLEDGE 



MIND 



INCLUDING FAMILIAR EXPLANATIONS OF THE TERMS EM- 
PLOYED ON SUBJECTS RELATING TO THE 
INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 



BY ISAAC TAYLOR, JUNIOR. 



Nee manus nuda, nee Intellectus sibi 
permissus, multiim valet:— Bacon. 



LONDON: 

PUBLISHED BY B. J. HOLDSWORTH, 

18, st. Paul's church-yard. 

1822. 









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CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Preface v 



PART I, 

Chap. I. On the use of familiar comparisons and 
colloquial phrases in explaining the 
nature and operations of the Mind.... 1 
II. On the three chief excellencies of 

Human Nature 12 

III. On different States of the Mind to 

which the word Thinking' is com- 
monly applied.... 19 

IV. On the formation of General Notions, 

aud the use of General Words 31 

V. On the meaning of the words Genus, 

Species, and Generalization 37 

VI. On the origin and nature of Abstract 

Notions..., 44 

VII. On different kinds of Abstract Notions.. 47 
VIII. On the difference between Simple Ab- 
stract Notions, and Complex Abstract 

Notions , 54 

a2 






IV CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Chap. IX. On Analysis, Classification, and Ar- 
rangement 57 

X. On the Analysis of Complex Abstract 

Notions 64 

XI. On Efforts of Abstraction of different 

kinds 69 



PART II. 

Containing, in Alphabetical order, brief and 
familiar explanations of the principal terms 
employed on subjects relating to the nature 
and operations of the Intellectual Powers 77 

A Summary, exhibiting the mutual relation of 
the Words explained in the Vocabulary 201 



PREFACE. 

»$&■•« 

The design of this volume is to impart, in a 
famine* form, elementary explanations and instruc- 
tions on subjects connected with the intellectual 
faculties, — to afford gradual and easy exercises to 
the powers of abstraction, — and thus, to conduct 
the young reader, not perhaps by the most direct, 
i*HHby the most accessible path into that region 
of thought where the mind best acquires force, 
accuracy, and comprehension. 

A writer who invites the attention of young per- 
sons to subjects which demand a continued effort 
of thought, is strongly tempted to win that atten- 
tion by some promise of amusement; or to profess 
that he has the art of communicating knowledge 
without the cost of labour on the part of those who 
receive it. No such promise or profession will be 
offered in the present instance. The author believes 
that when the professed object is to give tone and 
vigour to the understanding by exertion, trivial 
digressions, and gaieties of style should be avoided. 
a3 



Vlll PREFACE. 

of occasional reference. The correlative terms are 
mentioned at the end of each article, in order that 
the explanations of connected subjects may be 
readily compared. A Summary at the end of the 
volume exhibits all the terms in their mutual 
dependance. 

While it has been attempted to adapt the phrase- 
ology to the comprehension of intelligent and well- 
informed children, the volume is especially dedicated 
to the service of that numerous class of young per- 
sons who, having received only a common education, 
eagerly desire, as far as their engagements in active 
life will permit, to supply the defects consequent 
upon the partial and unconnected culture of the 
mind. 

Ongar, 
April, 1822. 



PART I. 



CHAP I. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



On the use of familiar comparisons and colloquial 

phrases in explaining the nature and 

operations of the Mind. 



When it is said that the Sun rises in the 
East, and sets in the West, every one knows 
that this manner of speaking does not truly 
describe the cause of the Sun's apparent motion 
through the heavens : it is a mode of expression 
which corresponds with what we see ; not with 
what we learn by more accurate observation 
and reflection. 

But although this mode of speaking is not 
correct, yet it may serve the purposes of 

B 



2 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

common conversation better than scientific 
phrases would do. And we may often reason 
very justly when the literal sense of the words 
we use is wholly incorrect : as for example ; 
when it is said that a Navigator who sails 
round the world, taking his course from 
Europe to the straits of Magellan, and from 
thence home by the Cape of Good Hope, will 
lose a day in his reckoning, because, as the 
Sun travels from East to West, every day 
will be a little lengthened as he proceeds. 

This reasoning would not be more just, if, 
instead of saying that the Sun travels from 
East to West, we were to speak of the diurnal 
motion of. the Earth in astronomical terms. 

A familiar style of expression, in which 
things are spoken as they appear to be, and 
not exactly as they are, is often to be preferred 
to a more scientific style ; because it is easily 
understood, and, generally, it is more concise. 

This is the case, especially, when we have to 
speak of the powers, or operations, or notions 
of the mind ; because, as these subjects are in 
themselves rather difficult to be understood, it 
is necessary that they should be first introduced 
into the mind in the most familiar manner. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT.. 3 

In this little volume, therefore, forms of ex- 
pression will often be employed, "which repre- 
sent the common imperfect notions that are 
formed concerning the operations of the mind, 
rather than those more accurate notions which 
we may adopt when we are able to think more 
patiently and clearly on the subject : we must 
at present speak of the mind in the same 
familiar style that we employ when we say of 
the Sun, that it rises and sets; or that it 
travels through the heavens. 

As the young reader gradually becomes 
familiar with subjects of this kind, which re- 
quire some effort of the understanding, he will 
be able to think of them more easily ; to com- 
prehend them more perfectly ; and to speak of 
them more correctly. 

There are three different styles, or modes of 
expression, in which the same idea may be 
conveyed. 

The first is the Colloquial style, or the 
style of common conversation. 

The second is the Figurative style. 

The third is the Philosophical style. 

I. The colloquial style. It has already 
been said that in common conversation we speak 
b2 



4 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

of things as they appear to us at a first glance, 
and not according to those more accurate 
notions concerning them which are acquired 
by careful examination and reflection. As, in 
the instance just mentioned, we are used to 
say that the Sun rises and sets, or that it 
travels from East to West ; because it appears 
to move, while the Earth stands still ; yet we 
know, while we employ these expressions, that 
the very reverse of this is true. 

The piston of a pump is said to suck the 
water into the barrel : this is a coiloqual ex- 
pression. In truth, it is the weight of the 
external air which lifts, or drives the water 
into the vacant space left in the barrel when 
the piston rises. 

We say vermillion is red, though the red- 
ness is not in the substance itself, but in that 
part of the light which is thrown off from a 
body which perfectly imbibes the yellow and 
blue rays. 

Many instances of this sort might be men- 
tioned, in which we speak of things as they 
seem to be ; not as they are ; and yet, though 
the mode of expression is incorrect, or false, 
what is affirmed may be perfectly true : for 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 5 

example: The piston as was just before said, 
will raise water in a pump to the height of 
three and thirty feet : this is true, although it 
is not really the piston which raises the water, 
but the weight of the external air. What is 
meant is, that water in a pipe, where it is 
freed from the pressure of the atmosphere on 
its upper surface, will rise to the height of 
three and thirty feet. 

In treating of subjects relating to the mind, 
a great number of colloquial expressions are 
employed, which are useful, and sufficient on 
common occasions, though they are very far 
from being strictly correct : for example : — 

It is usual to describe the mind of man 
as consisting of several separate parts, or 
faculties,— as the imagination, — the under- 
standing, — the memory, — the will, — the faculty 
of attention, — the power of abstraction, &c. 
We feel that we have several different kinds of 
thoughts, or states of mind ; and hence it is 
natural to us to fancy that the mind, like the 
body, consists of separate parts, or members, 
or organs. When we have learned to think 
patiently and accurately we may perhaps find 
that these colloquial expressions are not more 
b3 



6 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

correct than those which speak of the Sun's 
rising or travelling ; or of a piston sucking up 
water. But in the mean time it should be re- 
membered, that what is affirmed concerning 
the mind may be useful and true, so far as 
practical instruction is concerned, although the 
mode of expression is false or inaccurate. It 
appears then, that the colloquial style is that 
mode of speaking which corresponds with 
those inaccurate notions of things that are 
formed without careful examination or re- 
flection ; but that yet it is true enough for 
the ordinary purposes of conversation, or 
instruction. 

II. The figurative style is that manner of 
expressing our ideas in which we compare 
one thing to another. If, instead of saying 
colloquially, the Sun rises and sets, we say 
the Sun pursues his course through the 
heavens ; — this is a figurative expression ; 
because we compare the Sun to a man who 
runs a race; — as David beautifully says " he 
rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race." A 
great proportion of all conversation, as well as 
of public speaking and writing, consists of 
figurative expressions. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 7 

There are three reasons for using the figura- 
tive style. 

1st. Because it is often the shortest and 
simplest way of expressing our meaning ; 
especially when we are describing the qualities, 
or feelings, or operations of the mind. If we 
say, such a man has a brilliant genius ; we 
convey a general notion of what we mean in 
two words ; whereas if the same notion were 
expressed without the aid of a comparison, 
perhaps fifty words must be used ; and a 
greater effort of the mind would be needed to 
comprehend what was meant. The mind of 
the person to whom this expression is applied, 
is compared to a lamp, burning with a clear 
and sparkling flame. Such a lamp sheds an 
agreeable splendour upon every object around 
it ; and it is more useful, as well as more 
agreeable than a dull lamp : therefore it attracts 
attention, while dull lamps about it are not 
regarded. On these accounts it may serve as 
a fit comparison when we wish to describe the 
mind of a man whose ideas follow each other 
rapidly ; who expresses them clearly, and in 
a manner that gives pleasure as well as infor- 
mation, to those who hear him. 
b 4 



8 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Common phrases, such as the following, — a 
tender spirit, a warm heart, a solid judgement, 
an enlightened understanding, a pure con- 
science, an elevated mind, — are all figurative 
expressions, in which a quality, or feeling, 
or operation of the mind is compared to some 
sensible object, for the sake of expressing in 
two words a notion which would require several 
sentences to describe it at length. 

It is a useful exercise of the understanding 
to take such figurative phrases, and find out, — 
1st. What the object is which is employed as 
a comparison : 2nd. What the notion is to 
which this object is compared : — and 3rd. In 
what respects the two things resemble each 
other. 

Many figurative expressions of this kind will 
be employed in the following chapters. It 
must, however, always be remembered, that a 
figurative phrase can never perfectly convey 
the notion which it is used to represent : 
therefore, after a comparison has conveyed a 
general, or indistinct notion to the young 
reader's mind, he ought to examine the notion 
more carefully while he disregards the com- 
parison. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 9 

2nd. The figurative style is often employed 
because it is the only way in which we can 
express some very imperfect notion ; or some 
fact which we scarcely understand at all. 

For example : an idea is often said to be 
deeply impressed on the memory. This figu- 
rative expression is used because we do not 
know in what way a thought which has once 
been in the mind, is apt frequently to return^ 
or so to remain that we can, as often as we 
please, bring it back : all this we do not under- 
stand ; but we fancy it takes place in a way 
that may be compared to figures or letters 
being impressed upon wax, by a seal ; we use 
this comparison therefore, because it is the 
only way of expressing the incomplete notion 
we have of memory. 

3rd. The figurative style is often employed 
merely because comparisons give pleasure to 
the mind : comparisons employed for the sake 
of the pleasure they offered to the imagination^ 
make up a great part of all poetry. When our 
object is to enquire after truth, or to teach what 
we know to others, we should avoid poetical 
comparisons ; because they divert the attention ; 
and because we are apt to fancy that we under- 
b5 



10 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

stand a subject, -when we are merely pleased 
with the beauty or aptness of a similitude. 

III. The Philosophical Style. 

After we have examined any object with close 
and patient attention ; and have made our- 
selves as perfectly acquainted with its nature 
as possible ; we endeavour to express all that 
we know concerning it, and nothing more, in 
the plainest and simplest words we can find. 
This is the Philosophical style. 

To say that the Sun rises in the East, and 
sets in the West, is to speak colloquially. 

To say that the Sun pursues his course 
through the heavens like a charioteer, is to 
speak figuratively. 

To say that the apparent motion of the Sun 
from East to West is occasioned by the diurnal 
revolution of the Earth on its axis, is to speak 
philosophically. 

Or if, instead of using the words diurnal and 
revolution, and axis, which are derived from 
the latin and greek languages, we were simply 
to say — the Earth turns round once every day 
like a wheel ; this more familiar mode of 
expression would be as philosophical as the 
other ; because it represents the fact with 
equal exactness. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 11 

Now, as the designof this volume is to afford 
easy exercises to the understanding upon sub- 
jects relating to the mind, the colloquial and 
figurative styles will chiefly be employed, in 
order to render this introduction to such subjects 
as familiar and comprehensible as possible. In 
proportion as the young reader's power of 
thinking is strengthened by instruction and 
exertion, he will be able to comprehend abstract 
propositions without the aid of comparisons, 
examples, and colloquial phrases : thus his 
notions will become gradually more philoso- 
phical ; by which is merely meant that they 
will be more exactly true* 



b& 



12 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



CHAP. II. 

On the three chief excellencies of Human Nature, 

If a person were shut up in a corner of some 
great machine, where there was only a glim- 
mering of light; and if the machine were 
constantly in swift motion, and a hundred 
wheels were whirling round, while hammers 
and rollers and chains were making an incessant 
din, he would scarcely be able to gain a perfect 
and comprehensive knowledge of the construc- 
tion and movements of the machine after many 
months of close attention. 

But a person placed in such a situation would 
derive one great advantage from his peculiar 
circumstances, — namely, that he must acquire 
a habit of quick and accurate observation, and 
of close and patient attention : after some time, 
he would learn to distinguish obscure objects, 
and to comprehend intricate forms and move- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 13 

merits, which, to others, would appear a mass 
of unintelligible confusion. 

Now when we endeavour to comprehend the 
nature and the operations of our own minds we 
are like the person who is shut up within the 
machine while it continues in motion. It will 
be found more difficult to understand our own 
minds, than to comprehend the nature of ex- 
ternal objects, which may be seen and handled. 
But, for this very reason, there is a peculiar 
advantage belonging to studies of this sort — 
namely, that those who accustom themselves 
to reflect upon the operations of their own 
minds, and to study the construction and the 
various changes of the rational principle, 
acquire the habit of thinking more patiently 
and more accurately than those who employ 
their thoughts only upon sensible objects. 

A principal use, therefore, of such pursuits 
is, that they give more exercise to the powers 
of the mind than any other subjects ; so that 
even if they seemed to be in themselves of less 
practical importance than other studies they 
would still be indispensible to a complete 
education. The time to pay attention to 
them is that period of life when the under- 



14 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT, 

standing expands, and while it is most capable 
of improvement. 

There are many persons who appear to think 
little ; or whose manner of thinking is always 
inaccurate and confused although their under- 
standings are naturally strong. The reason 
often is that they have never learned to direct 
the course of their thoughts ; nor have the 
notions which fill their minds ever been set in 
order : they have not acquired the power of 
attending separately to single ideas, or of 
distinguishing clearly one from another. The 
greater the effort they make to think, the more 
confusion there seems to be among their ideas ; 
hence it happens that they are soon discouraged, 
and are willing to receive all their opinions 
from other men ; or perhaps they become posi- 
tive in affirming what they are conscious that 
they do not understand. If such persons had 
early learned to think with ease and correctness 
they might have been less servile, or less 
dogmatical. 

But besides this confusion of thought which 
discourages men from employing the natural 
powers of their understanding, the mind, like 
the body, has a constant tendency to sink into 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 15 

a state of inactivity. If a man indulges habits 
of bodily indolence, the natural powers of the 
constitution are impaired; and exertion be- 
comes every year he lives more and more irk- 
some. This wretched condition is, however, 
so painful in itself, so injurious to worldly 
interests, and so disgraceful, that it is com- 
paratively but a few individuals who suffer 
themselves to sink into it. 

• But the indolence of the mind is less apparent 
than the indolence of the body ; and those who 
are the most subject to it may scarcely themselves 
be aware of their real condition. Persons may 
converse as they hear others converse ; and do 
what they see others do : they may repeat what 
has been fixed in the memory, and believe what 
they have been taught, or what best pleases 
their particular tempers ; while their minds 
may be as completely inactive, and as in- 
capable of exertion, as the body is during 
sleep. This, we must acknowledge, to be a 
very degraded state for a being whose mind 
is, by nature, capable of much more activity 
than his body : but yet r it is certain* that the 
minds of the greater part of mankind are in 
this inactive state. 



16 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

It is, in great measure, owing to this general 
and habitual indolence of the human mind, that 
millions of men, from one generation to another, 
continue to be deluded by childish and wicked 
superstitions. 

It is owing to this mental indolence in the mass 
of mankind, that one man, whose mind is active, 
often finds it easy to persuade thousands of his 
fellow-men to receive some fanciful opinions of 
his own : or to induce them to follow him in 
absurd and mischievous enterprises, which 
must bring miseries upon themselves and their 
neighbours. 

It is, in part, owing to the indolence of the 
mind, that men, who have heard that there is 
a future life, which will be happy or wretched 
according to their conduct and the state of 
their minds in the present life; yet make them- 
selves tranquil while they pay no sufficient 
regard to the means of securing happiness in 
the life to come. 

The indolence of the mind prevents men 
from feeling themselves degraded while they 
are seeking chiefly the gratifications of the 
body, or those gratifications of the mind which 
are more foolish and useless than the painted 
toys of children. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 17 

111 the common affairs of life it may be 
observed, that men appear to be more in- 
fluenced in their conduct by little motives, 
which they would be ashamed to confess, than 
by important and reasonable considerations : 
hence it is that the affairs of men are often 
turned about in a way that cannot be accounted 
for ; because the real motives of their actions 
are too small to be known or noticed. This 
also is chiefly owing to the habitual indolence 
of the mind which lessens the force of reason. 

Men are often pleased with false opinions, 
even while they secretly suspect them to be 
false : and they are glad to be deceived when 
they wish to do what they know to be foolish 
or wicked. But if they thought more it would 
not be possible for them to deceive themselves 
so easily. 

We must not imagine, however, that if the 
minds of men were more active, — if they 
thought oftener, and if they thought more 
justly, they would always believe what is true, 
and do what is right. It is not activity of 
mind alone, that is necessary to our well being ; 
for there are three things in which the true 
excellency of human nature consists :— * 



18 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

The first and chief of them is Goodness, or 
virtue; which consists in loving God supremely, 
and in loving others as we love ourselves. 

The second is Knowledge. 

The third is the habit of thinking much, and 
the power of thinking justly. 

Now we enter upon life without Goodness, 
without Knowledge, and without the active 
power of Thinking. These excellencies must 
be obtained by our own endeavours,, in the use 
of certain means. 

Goodness is the gift of God, to, those who 
ask him for it, through our Saviour, Jesus 
Christ. 

Knowledge is acquired by attention to what 
we see, hear, and read. 

The power of Thinking is acquired and im- 
proved by the early cultivation and the constant 
exercise of the understanding. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 19 



CHAP. III. 

On different States of the Mind to ivhich the word 
Thinking, is commonly applied. 

The word Thinking is commonly applied to 
several very different states of the mind. We 
must learn to distinguish them. 

I. There is one state of the mind in which 
the thoughts, or the images of objects that have 
been seen, or recollections of what has been 
heard, or felt, follow each other, without any 
action of the Will, in making a choice among 
them, or in exercising command over them. 
Ideas flow on before the fancy, like straws, 
sticks, and leaves, floating on the surface of 
a rapid stream. The mind in this state may 
be compared to a person sitting at a window, 
who idly stares at the crowd which passes before 
him : he has no kind of influence over those who 
are passing and repassing, standing or moving, 
in the Street. This state of the mind is called 



20 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

dreaming when the body sleeps ; and musing 
when the body is awake : but it is also very 
usual for persons to say that they have been 
thinking, when their minds have been in this 
state. 

II. There is another state of the mind in 
which it is entirely occupied with the objects 
perceived by the senses ; it sees, hears, feels, 
tastes, smells ; or it has some internal sensation ; 
as hunger, thirst, pain. These perceptions or 
sensations excite emotions of desire, or fear ? 
or satisfaction, or uneasiness, according to the 
nature of the objects which affect the senses, 
or the internal feelings. The particular state 
of the mind is the effect of some cause which 
operates upon it : as sealing wax becomes soft, 
when it is placed near the fire ; or brittle, when 
exposed to cold : it takes this shape, or that 
shape, according to the figure which is im- 
pressed upon it. 

III. There is another state of the mind in 
which it exercises command over its thoughts : 
it chooses what particular state it will be in. 
It either attends to some external object ; or it 
disregards all external objects ; though perhaps 
they may be making strong impression upon 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 2t 

the senses, while it attends to its own operations. 
It commands one thought to stay ; or calls it 
back after it has passed by ; it brings several 
ideas together, and compares them ; or it 
separates ideas that come into the mind closely 
joined together. The mind in this state is not 
like the man who stares idly at a passing 
crowd ; but like the General of an army, who, 
not only perceives the objects before him ; but 
who directs, at his pleasure, all the movements 
that take place. 

The two first are Passive states of the 
mind. 

The third is the Active state of the Mind, 
and it is this only which is properly called 
Thinking. 

It is important to perceive perfectly the dis- 
tinction between the active and the passive 
states of the mind ; because the very wide 
differences which are observable in the cha- 
racter and condition of men greatly depend 
upon the degree in which their minds are? 
habitually, in an active or in a passive state. 

Some examples will show what is meant by 
the words active and passive. 



22 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

A thing is said to he passive when a change 
takes place in its state or in its situation from 
the operation of some external cause. 

A cannon ball is passive, when it is thrown 
through the air by the combustion of gun- 
powder: the tower against which the ball 
strikes is passive, when it is overthrown by the 
blow : The Sea is passive, when it is tossed 
into billows by the wind. 

A thing is said to be active, when it changes 
its own state or situation, or the state or 
situation of some other thing. (See the word 
cause, Part II.) 

It might be said that the gunpowder which 
propels the ball is active ; or that the ball is 
active when it batters down the tower ; but 
more strictly speaking, the ball is as passive 
w r hen its progress is interrupted by the tower, 
as when it is thrown from the cannon : the 
gunpowder, also, is passive, when it is changed 
from a solid to a gaseous state by the action 
of fire. 

Those things are most properly called active, 
which begin to act of themselves, without 
being influenced by any external cause. Now, 
the only things which begin to act of them- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 23 

selves are those which hare thought $ as 
animals, men, and other intelligent beings* 
All creatures, however, are passive as well as 
active. God alone is entirely active, because 
his state cannot be changed by any external 
cause ; and he is the beginning, or first 
cause of all the action which takes place in 
the universe. He has, however, granted to 
animals, to men, and to other intelligent 
creatures some degrees of active power. Dif- 
ferent creatures possess active power in 
different degrees : the lowest degree of active 
power is that which makes a creature able to 
move its own body : the highest degree of 
active power is that which makes a creature 
able to command its own thoughts, or to 
change the state of its mind by Will. This 
will appear more plainly in some examples. 
We begin by mentioning things which are 
entirely passive. 

1. A pebble which we gather from the sea 
shore is not in the same state in which it always 
has been : that which we now see is, probably, 
all that remains of what, a thousand years ago, 
was a large rough fragment of rock : it has 
been worn small, round, and smooth, by con- 



24 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tinual friction against other stones, during the 
ebbing and flowing of the tide. This pebble, 
therefore, is entirely passive, because the 
changes it has undergone have been wholly 
produced by external causes. 

2. If we break a flint which has been dug 
from a chalk pit, we perceive the appearance 
of its having been formed gradually; there are 
faint granulations or laminae in it : it has shot 
out into irregular shapes ; and it has become 
surrounded with a thin white crust. In this 
gradual formation of the flint there is some 
slight resemblance to the kind of action which 
is called growth in vegetables and animals. 
Yet it is merely a resemblance ; for the silice- 
ous matter has merely been deposited where 
space was left for it in the chalk. The flint 
that has gradually increased in size, is as 
passive as the pebble which has been gradually 
diminished. 

3. A vegetable undergoes many great 
changes from the first bursting of the seed in 
the earth, to the time when the branches and the 
stem wither and decay. These changes are 
produced by the action of the sun, the air, the 
rain, the soil; along with that principle of 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 25 

life, of the nature of which we know nothing. 
A vegetable, therefore, may be said to be pas- 
sive in the changes it undergoes ; yet vegetable 
life much more nearly resembles action pro- 
ceeding from itself, than the growth of stones 
does. 

4. There is one circumstance which is the 
occasion of most of the differences between 
Animals and Vegetables. It is this ; — the 
preservation of the life of a vegetable de- 
pends entirely upon what happens to it from 
without : its food, — air, water, and the juices 
of the soil, come to it : if they cease to come 
to it, it dies. 

But although the preservation of the life of 
an animal depends, in part, like that of the 
vegetable, upon what happens to it from 
without, it depends also upon its own move- 
ments or actions. An animal moves to its 
food; its food does not come to it. Now a 
being whose preservation depends upon its own 
movements, must be able to guide those move- 
ments not by chance, or only in certain direc- 
tions, as the planets move ; but according to 
its knowledge of things around it : such a 
being, therefore, must have thought: it must 
c 



20 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

perceive the difference between one thing and 
another : it must be conscious of pleasure, in 
receiving that which tends to preserve its life ; 
and of pain, when any thing happens to it 
which tends to destroy its life : it must desire 
what will give it pleasure; and fear what will 
give it pain : it must have power to reach what 
it desires, and to shun what it fears. An 
animal, therefore, must haVe Perception, and 
Will, and Power ; because its life depends 
constantly upon the agreement of its actions 
with the particular circumstances in which it 
is every moment placed. 

When, therefore, we compare the meanest 
animal with the noblest plant or tree, we must 
acknowledge that the animal is of a higher 
order than the vegetable ; because it has within 
itself a power to move, and a knowledge of 
things around it, by which to direct its move- 
ments : an animal, then, is an active being. 

An animal moves ; and it moves from 
thought : this is what distinguishes it from a 
vegetable. But what is it which distinguishes 
inferior animals from man ? 

The thoughts of animals seem, (so far as 
we are able to judge,) to be entirely caused, 



i 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 27 

or influenced, either by the objects which 
they perceive through the senses ; or by their 
internal sensations, such as hunger, thirst, 
fatigue, &c. They do indeed act according to 
thought, or knowledge ; but their thoughts are 
constantly the effects of what they perceive or 
feel. It is only perhaps, in some small degree, 
if at all, that animals choose what they will 
think. Animals command their bodies as they 
wiU, but Man commands his mind, as he 
wills. 

5. This is what is meant when it is said that 
Man is endowed with reason ; he has power 
over his thoughts. He can suffer them to flow on 
without direction ; or he can leave them to be 
influenced by external objects ; or he can with- 
draw his mind entirely from the objects which 
he sees, hears, feels, tastes, smells : he can 
attend to one object, and put away others ; he 
can bring together thoughts that are similar; 
he can look at them together, and perceive 
wherein they are alike, and wherein they differ : 
he can frame complete notions, or disjoin 
them ; and he can imagine what he has 
never actually seen. This power over his 
thoughts enables man to improve his condition to 
c2 



28 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

a great extent ; because he can combine ideas 
in various forms ; and he can learn how to 
produce what he has imagined. Animals, left 
to themselves, continue always in the same 
state : But when men once begin to think, 
they soon improve their condition - 

Man, therefore, is a more active being than 
other animals ; because the changes which take 
place in his thoughts, often begin from himself, 
without the operation of any external cause, or 
any internal bodily feeling. 

When we say that man is an active being, 
we mean, that he is by nature capable of be- 
coming active ; for in fact, the minds of a great 
proportion of mankind continue always in 
a more passive state than those of Dogs ? 
Monkeys, or Elephants. 

Now, this vast difference between one man 
and another, is, perhaps, the most remarkable 
circumstance belonging to human nature: it 
deserves therefore, to be particularly attended 
to, in order that we may be excited to acquire 
that Active Power in the mind which, next 
to Goodness, is the chief excellency of human 
nature. 

We must now mention again the three states 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 29 

of the mind, described at the beginning of this 
chapter. — 

The first is the state of musing or dreaming. 

The second is that in which the thoughts are 
caused by external objects, or by internal bodily 
sensations. 

The third is that in which the mind is itself 
the cause of its own thoughts. 

.The first two states are passive ; the third is 
active. 

The minds of persons whose bodies are in- 
dolent, feeble, or diseased, are most liable to 
be in the first state. 

The minds of children, of uneducated per- 
sons, of savages, of persons whose sensations 
are peculiarly lively, or whose bodies are more 
vigorous than their minds, are most liable to be 
in the second state. 

The third is the state — 1st. of those whose 
understandings have been early cultivated, and 
constantly exercised : 2d. of those who have 
been placed in peculiar circumstances, which 
have forced them to think ; and, 3d. of persons 
whose minds are naturally vigorous. 

Now the object of the following chapters is 
to describe two or three of the simplest opera- 
c3 



SO ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tions of the Mind, when it is in the active state; 
that is to say, when it thinks. 

It will, however, first, be necessary to de- 
scribe some things which take place in the 
Mind with little, or no effort of thought. 



ELExMENTS OF THOUGHT. 31 



CHAP IV. 

On the formation of General Notions, and the use 
of General Words, 

After a number of objects nearly alike in 
their general appearance have been seen, a 
notion is formed in the mind which is different 
from the recollection we may have of any one 
of those particular objects. This sort of notion 
is less distinct and perfect than the recollection 
of one particular object ; but it passes in and 
out of the mind more readily and quickly than 
such a particular recollection. 

An indistinct remembrance formed by several 
similar objects, is called a General Notion. 

When a General notion has thus been formed 
in the mind, we employ some one word to 
signify the notion ; which word serves as the 
name of every particular object that is found to 
agree with the notion. A word which belongs 
to a General notion, and which serves as the 
c4 



32 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

name of many similar things, is called a 
General, or Common Term. 

The words Man, Horse, Star, Book, are 
General terms : They signify the General 
notions which have been formed in the mind by 
seeing many men, many horses, many stars, 
many books. 

When we have been long used to apply some 
General name to a number of similar things, 
we are apt to think of them as if they were 
really connected together in some way ; though 
the only real connection between them is that 
which has taken place in our own minds. 

Another circumstance follows from the use 
of General terms ; and as it is the occasion of 
many mistakes in thinking and speaking, it 
is necessary to be aware of it. 

It is this, — That we gradually fall into the 
habit of using General names without having in 
the miad any image of the particular things to 
which the name belongs ; or even any Genera' 
notion of them. It is thus that we learn to think 
of words more than of the things of which they 
are the names ; and unless an effort is made to 
counteract this habit the mind becomes almost 
incapable of thinking without using words ; or 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 33 

of thinking of ihings at all. Children think 
more of things than of words ; but most adults 
think more of words than of things. 

When we hear or repeat such sentences as 
the following, the words commonly pass through 
the mind without raising any image of the 
things spoken of : — 

( Man is born to labour.' 

f The Dog is an animal which renders im- 
portant services to man.' 

* A man who possesses lands, houses, furni- 
ture, and cattle, is rich ; but perhaps not 
happy/ 

* I met a man yesterday who begged alms of 
me.' 

We do not stay to think of the objects, unless 
there is something unusual belonging to them 
which rouses attention ; as for instance ; — 

' The crocodile haunts the banks of the 
Nile/ 

c I once saw an Eagle carry off a lamb from 
the flock.' 

? A great comet appeared in the year 1769.' 

Thus it happens that in proportion as objects 
are familiar to us, we forget them, when we use 
the words which represent them, and hence the 
c5 



34 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

mind acquires the habit of carrying on its oper- 
ations by the means of words without regard to 
things.. 

Those therefore who do not make frequent 
efforts to think of things when they use words, 
must think inaccurately though they may speak 
with propriety ; because their thoughts and 
opinions are liable to all the indistinctness and 
uncertainty which belong to words. For the 
sense of words depends upon the use which 
men happen to make of them : it is therefore 
continually changing by time and accident. 
The same word is often understood by different 
persons in very different senses ; and many 
words have several senses. Disputes often 
arise entirely from this cause ; — men have 
forgotten to think of things, and as words are 
uncertain there will always be room for disagree- 
ment and misapprehension in the use of them. 

It is true that we may very safely use the 
General terms which belong to the various 
natural objects around us ; because there is 
little danger of mistake in regard to things 
which are frequently before our eyes, and which 
are easily examined. Besides ; — the various- 
kinds of animals and vegetables, and other 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 35 

natural objects, continue always nearly the 
same. We may therefore safely use such 
words oak, lion, star T cloud, stone, fish, 
copper, snow ; without stopping to recollect 
the image of the things themselves. 

But when we are speaking of things which 
cannot be perceived by the senses ; such as the 
qualities, or feelings, or abstract notions of the 
mind, we are liable to perpetual mistakes, if 
we have fallen into the habit of using words 
with little regard to the things they signify. 

Abstract terms especially, such as the fol- 
lowing, are very apt to slip through the mind 
without bringing any distinct notion along with 
them : — Reason, Instinct, Wisdom, Genius, 
Justice, Partiality, Pride, Liberty, Power, 
Truth, Virtue, Religion. But those who wish 
to acquire the power and the habit of thinking 
well, must not allow themselves indolently to 
fancy that they know what they mean when 
they use words of this sort ; or imagine that 
they could, if it were necessary, describe their 
meaning. They must, on the contrary, often 
think of such notions apart from words ; 
and they must learn to analyse them, in the 
way that will be explained in a following chapter, 
eft 



36 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

They must labour to make them more and more 
correct and distinct, by continually comparing 
them with whatever they learn from books, 
from the study of their own minds, or from 
observation. 

The sum of what has been said in this 
chapter is this ; — 

The mind does not remember separately all 
the individual things which it has ever per- 
ceived ; but it retains one general and indistinct 
recollection of many similar things ; and to 
each general notion of this sort, one word is 
applied, which serves as the name of each of 
those similar things. 

Now, as it is more easy to think of one thing, 
than of many, we are apt to think more of the 
one name of a general notion, than of the 
things themselves ; especially in things which 
relate to the mind, and which require some 
eifort of thought to conceive of them distinctly. 

It is unavoidable that this habit should be 
formed ; but it is the business of a good educa- 
tion to form a contrary habit, — namely, — that 
of comparing General notions with the things 
which they ought to represent ; and of examin- 
ing things without regard to the words that 
have been connected with them in the mind. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 37 



CHAP. V. 

On the meaning of the words Genus, Species, - 
and Generalization. 

It has been shewn that one General notion is 
formed of many particular objects ; and that 
one name is employed to signify all the objects 
which are sufficiently alike to be comprehended 
in the same general notion. But very often the 
particular objects to which one name is given, 
are found to differ in many respects, when more 
attentively compared with each other. For 
example : — 

The word tree belongs to a general notion 
which we have formed of a thing growing from 
the ground, with root, stem, branches, and 
leaves. Whenever we see a thing growing 
from the ground, and having a stem, branches, 
and leaves, we call it a Tree ; although it may 
differ from other trees in all respects, except 
these which have been mentioned. 



38 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

When we perceive some object very different 
from any thing which we have hitherto seen, the 
first act of the mind is to think what it is most 
like ; and if we can see, or fancy any resem- 
blance to some thing already known, we im- 
mediately apply the name of it to the strange 
object. 

If a child is shown foreign animals, without 
having been told their names, he will probably 
call the Lion, a great Dog ; the Tiger, a great 
Cat ; the Elephant, a Cow with a long nose ;. 
an Ostrich he may call a Swan ;, and a Croco- 
dile, a Lizard: his mind is uneasy till he has 
placed the new objects along with some of the 
general notions he has already acquired, and 
given to them the names of these notions. 

The same thing has often been observed in 
Savages, when first visited by Europeans : a 
Ship they call a house upon the water ; or a 
great canoe: and each utensil, or article of 
furniture, they quickly compare with some- 
thing already known to them. In such in- 
stances two appellations are usually employed : 
the first of them expresses the resemblance 
of the new object to something known : the 
second, expresses the difference which is per- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 39 

ceived between the strange and the familiar 
object : as in the instance just mentioned, a 
child will, probably, call an Elephant, a Cow, — 
with a long nose. 

Thus it appears that the first act of the mind 
is to observe the resemblance of one thing to 
others : this is the origin of General notions 
comprehending many similar things. 

The second act of the mind is to take notice 
of the difference between similar things. 

We discover that the similar objects of which 
we have formed one General notion are un- 
like in many respects. We begin then to sort 
the whole into smaller parcels, by observing, 
first, the resemblances, and then the differences, 
which are found among them. 

Now a multitude of things which we have 
observed to be similar in some respects, is called 
a Genus ; and the smaller parcels into which 
we afterwards divide the whole, are called 
Species : 

For Example : — * 



* It may be necessary here to remark, that, in this and 
other instances, the writer has not drawn his examples from 
scientific classifications ; believing that more obvious and 
familiar distinctions are much better adapted to the imme- 
diate purposes of logical elucidation. 



40 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

We form a General notion of things which 
have life, which grow, and die ; which move 
from place to place ; and which preserve their 
lives by their own efforts. The word Animal 
is the name affixed in the mind to this General 
notion ; and all the particular things to which 
the above description may be applied are said 
to belong to the Genus, — Animal, Having 
this notion, and the name of it,- — animal, in 
the mind, if we were transported to the moon, 
and were there to see objects entirely different 
from any thing found upon the Earth, except 
that they moved about, apparently according 
to their own will, we should immediately call 
them animals ; although unlike any creatures 
to which we had hitherto given that name ; we 
should also call them all by this one name, — 
animal ; although we perceived them to differ 
widely from each other. 

So, in fact, we call all things animals which 
agree with the general notion that has been 
described. We perceive, however, that there 
are parcels of them which differ in some 
respects from other parcels. Some animals, 
for instance, move upon the Earth ; others live 
in the water; others traverse the air. W T e 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 41 

therefore divide the multitude of animals into 
three Species ; — Beasts, Birds, and Fishes. 
Now these three words are the names of 
General notions ; but they are all compre- 
hended in the larger notion signified by the 
name Animal. Animal, then, is the Genus ; 
Beast, — Bird, — Fish, — are the Species. 

When a Genus has been thus divided into 
Species, any one of these species may be taken 
and divided into smaller parcels, by observing 
some further circumstances in which the things 
included in it differ. 

The parcel which was called a species, in 
relation to the large collection, or Genus, is 
now itself considered as a Genus, in relation 
to the smaller parcels, or species, into which 
it is divided :— For example : — 

Birds are a species of animal : but we per- 
ceive that some birds prey upon other animals ; 
while some subsist upon grain. Birds, there- 
fore, may be divided into two species, — Carni- 
vorous, and Granivorous. These two species 
may be again divided into smaller parcels, ac- 
cording to still smaller differences observable in 
their size, or shape, or colour, or mode of life : 
we may go on dividing and dividing, till we 



42 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

can no longer discover any certain and constant 
differences by which to distinguish one bird 
from another. After this, if we have occasion 
to speak of some one bird, we either point to 
it, and say, that Peacock, or this Linnet ; or 
we give to it a name which belongs to itself 
alone ; as is done to some domestic animals. 

It is plain then, that the notice we take of 
the resemblances of things gives us General 
notions, and that our observation of the dif- 
ferences of things leads us to separate the mul- 
titude of things comprehended in a General 
notion into smaller parcels, — the large col- 
lection called a Genus, the smaller, Species. 

When we wish to make some particular 
thing known, so that what we intend cannot be 
mistaken, we first mention the Genus in which 
it is comprehended, and then, we either simply 
name the particular Species to which it belongs, 
or, if that is not sufficient, we describe exactly 
the particular circumstance in which it differs 
from the other things contained in the same 
Genus; — this is called a Definition. A Defi- 
nition is made by naming the Genus, and 
describing the difference between it and the 
other species :-— For example : — 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 43 

A Whale is a fish, which suckles its young. 

A Bat is a quadruped, which flies through 
the air. 

A snake is a reptile, having no feet. 

Platina is a metal, heavier than any other. 

(Seethe word Definition, Part II.) 

The word Generalization, is used some- 
times, to express the act of the mind while it 
is employed in the way that has now been 
described, in distributing a multitude of things 
into Genera* and species. 

Sometimes it is employed to signify the act 
of the mind in taking notice of some one object, 
in order to discover what genus, and what 
species it belongs to. 



Genera is the plural of the latin word Genus. 



44 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



CHAP. VI. 

On the origin and nature of Abstract Notions. 

If several marbles are before us, we merely 
observe their perfect resemblance to each other. 
But if we see together a marble, a bullet, a 
ball, a glass bubble, and an apple, we are led 
to take notice of their similarity in one respect, 
namely, — shape ; and at the same time to 
observe their unlikeness in all other respects. 
We think of them as different things alike in 
shape. The mind forms a distinct and separate 
notion of this likeness in shape ; and then 
seeks for a word to represent the notion. The 
word roundness is used. This is not the name 
of any one sort of thing, like the word marble ; 
but it is the name of a notion that has been 
formed after we have taken notice of some one 
respect in which different objects are alike. 

With the help of the name which we have 
given to this separate notion, we can con- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 45 

veniently think and speak of a particular shape, 
while we entirely forget the other qualities or 
appearances of the various objects to which it 
may belong. 

This act of the mind, when it thinks of 
some one quality or circumstance apart from 
all the other qualities or appearances of the 
things in which that quality is found, is called 
Abstraction. 

Another example may be taken : — 
There are before us a square piece of ivory, 
and an egg, and a sheet of paper, and a piece 
of ermine, and a quantity of snow. These 
things are very unlike in all respects but one, 
namely, colour. This resemblance attracts 
attention : we think of it apart from the shape, 
hardness, smoothness, size, or use of the 
several objects ; and we call this resemblance 
whiteness. Whenever we hear the word We 
have a notion of this one quality, without any 
recollection of particular objects which are 
white. Such a notion is called an Abstract 
Notion, or idea ; and the name of it is called 
an Abstract Term. 

If all the qualities of all the things which we 
perceive by the senses were exactly the same, 



46 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

it is probable that we should never form any 
such abstract notions ; but should constantly 
think of all the qualities and appearances of 
things together ; and should perhaps be unable 
to separate them in thought one from another. 

The difference between General notions and 
Abstract notions will now be plain. 

Objects alike in many, or in most respects, 
cause the mind to form General notions, com- 
prehending a multitude of particular things. 

Dissimilar things, alike in some one respect, 
cause the mind to form Abstract notions of 
single qualities, 

Man, animal, oak, gold; are the names of 
General notions: 

Redness, swiftness, hardness, beauty; are 
the names of single qualities considered ab- 
stractedly, or apart from the objects in which 
they are found. 

A general term represents the whole of our 
notion of a thing, as hawk, tree. 

An abstract term expresses only one part 
of our notion of a thing ; as voraciousness, 
durability. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 47 



CHAP. VII. 

On different kinds of Abstract Notions. 

It has been shown in the last chapter that an 
abstract idea is the separate notion we form of 
some single quality, property, or circumstance, 
which has been observed in several dissimilar 
things. 

Snow and paper agree in whiteness: Iron 
and Stone resemble each other in hardness : 
Gold and Copper agree in ductility, and mal- 
leability ; which means that the shape of a mass 
of either of those metals may be changed by 
force, without breaking it into parts. A mass 
of Water or of oil is much more easily put into 
a new shape: this quality is called fluidity. 
After we have observed this quality in several 
things, we can think of fluidity without 
having in the mind any image of water, or of 
air, or of oil, or of melted metal. When we 
see a strange substance, if we find that some 



48 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

force is required to put a mass of it into a new 
shape ; but that yet it is not broken by the 
application of force, we remember the abstract 
notion we have before formed of ductility, and 
we say that this new substance is ductile. Or 
if a substance moves into the shape of the 
vessel which contains it, merely by its own 
weight, we are reminded of the notion which 
we have called fluidity. 

The simplest sort of abstract notions are 
those which we form of the qualities of objects 
known to us by the senses ; such as colour, 
hardness, shape, roughness, smoothness, loud- 
ness, sweetness, bitterness, &c. There are 
other abstract notions which are formed by 
reflection, and by the joining of several simple 
notions together. For example : — The word 
virtue represents an abstract notion, formed by 
the joining together of several ideas in the 
mind. When an intelligent being freely con- 
forms his actions and his thoughts to the will 
of God, he is said to be virtuous, or to act 
virtuously. The abstract term virtue repre- 
sents the notion we form, not of some particular 
action or feeling ; but of that quality of any 
action or feeling performed or felt by an 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 49 

intelligent being which renders it agreeable to 
the will of God. Virtue is not a thing that can 
be seen, heard, or felt ; but it is a quality of 
actions or feelings ; in the same way that 
fluidity is a quality of water, or of oil, or of 
any other substance which falls into a level 
surface merely by its own weight. 

Whenever we perceive that there is some 
property, or quality, or circumstance in dis- 
similar things, which, when we see or think 
of one of them, may put us in mind of the 
other, we may be sure an abstract notion has 
been formed in the mind ; although, perhaps, 
we may not be able to describe it in words. 
When we are searching for such a notion, or 
trying to express it in words, we are making 
an effort of abstraction ; that is,— we are* 
endeavouring to form in our minds a description 
of a particular circumstance belonging to 
several different things which shall suit all of 
them with exactly equal propriety. A person 
who is able to form such descriptions with 
readiness and correctness, is said to have a 
talent for abstraction ; or to be an abstract 
thinker. An example will show how such 
descriptions are formed. — When we think of a 

D 



50 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

watch, a plant, and an animal, do we hot per* 
ceive that there is some circumstance in which 
they are alike ? 

Let us then inquire what it is in which a 
plant, an animal, and a watch agree. We 
may take any one of these three things, and 
endeavour to form such a description of it, as 
shall suit the other two with equal correctness. 
Let us then take the last of them, and describe 
it thus, — A watch is a machine, so constructed 
as to measure time by the regulation of a 
pendulum. This, however, is a description of 
the watch which will suit neither the plant nor 
the animal. We take, then, the plant. A 
plant is a thing which grows from the ground ; 
gradually increases in size, lasts a certain time, 
and then decays : this description will suit 
neither the watch nor the animal. Let us try 
then to describe the animal. An Animal is a 
being which grows, and which moves by its 
own will ; and which, after it has for some time 
preserved its state, decays, or is destroyed. 
But this description of an animal will not suit 
the plant or the watch. We have not, there- 
fore, yet described that abstract notion which 
may cause us to think of these three things 
together, as having some resemblance. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 51 

Let us then describe a watch thus ; — It is a 
body, consisting* of various parts, so related to 
each other, as to produce certain constant 
movements and changes, with a view to some 
end or design. Now any thing to which this 
description may be applied is called an orga- 
nized body ; and the name of this abstract 
notion, formed in the mind by comparing 
such bodies is ^organization. Organization 
is that in which a plant, and an animal, and 
a watch agree ; for we may say of one of 
them with as much propriety as of another, 
that it is a body, consisting of various parts, 
so adjusted as to produce certain changes and 
movements, all having a tendency to some 
one end or design. 

There is, however, another abstract notion 
in which the plant and the animal agree ; but 
which does not belong to the watch. 



* The term organization is frequently restricted to vege- 
table and animal bodies ; but as, in its logical sense, it is 
susceptible of a wider application, the mechanical structure 
is here included for the sake of a more diversified exem- 
plification. 

d2 



52 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

This is Life : we cannot tell in what life 
consists, hut we see that it is something more 
than man is able to communicate to any 
machine. We can only describe it by the 
effects which we observe : these effects are,, a 
constant movement among the parts of the 
body ; a gradual increase in size, for a certain 
time; and a regular succession of changes 
ending in the dissolution of the whole This 
principle of Life might be compared to the 
action of the spring of a watch : but it would 
be a foolish misapplication of words to call 
the spring, the life of a watch ; as though 
the elasticity of the spring, and the principle 
of life in a plant or animal, were nearly the 
same things. 

Life is something which we do not under- 
stand ; but the effects of life which we observe 
are joined together by the mind, and form an 
abstract notion : and whenever we see these 
effects we remember the notion, and the name 
of it ; and we say such a thing has Life ; — 
either vegetable life, or animal life. 

It appears then, that the mind not only 
forms abstract notions of simple qualities, 
such as redness, sweetness, roughness, but 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 53 

also, that it has abstract notions in which a 
number of circumstances or qualities are 
joined together ; such as those signified by 
the words, ductility, fluidity, virtue, orga- 
nization. 



b3 



54 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



CHAP. VIII. 

On the difference between Simple Abstract Notions, 
and Complex Abstract Notions. 

The notions expressed by the words Life, 
Organization, Virtue, may be described, as 
was shown in the last chapter. But some 
abstract notions cannot be described by words : 
we can only give them single names. It is 
necessary to understand the difference between 
these two kinds of abstract notions. 

The notions signified by the words Redness, 
Sweetness, Existence, Pain, Pleasure, and 
many others, cannot be described : the reason 
of this is, that these notions consist of one 
idea received immediately, either from ex- 
ternal objects, by the senses ; or from our 
internal feelings, or consciousness. 

If it is necessary to make another person 
know more certainly what notion we are 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 55 

speaking of, we may employ some other word, 
nearly of the same meaning ; but we cannot 
convey to his mind by words any more of this 
notion than what he receives at once, as soon 
as he hears and understands the word we use. 

For example : — if the person to whom we 
speak does not happen to be acquainted with 
the meaning of the word Existence, we may 
use the synonymous word Being ; or we may 
vary the form of expression, by saying, — 
Whatever is, exists ; or has existence : but 
these several words or phrases are not descrip- 
tions of the notion ; they are merely different 
names of it. 

When no perfectly synonymous word can be 
found by which to express one of these simple 
notions, we may mention some object to which 
it belongs ; or some cause which produces it : 
Thus we may say redness is the colour of a 
rose : Pain is the state of the mind while the 
nerves are violently pressed, or torn, or cut. 
But this does not describe pain ; it only 
makes known what feeling it is to which we 
apply the word. 

Notions of this sort, which cannot be de- 
scribed may be called Simple Abstractions. 
p4 



5G ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Notions which may be described, because, 
they consist of several simple notions joined 
together, may be called Complex Abstrac- 
tions. 

If we attentively examine the notions sug- 
gested by the words Place, Distance, Equality, 
Proportion, Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, In- 
telligence, Viptue, Perfection, Design ; Utility, 
Organization, Truth, Liberty, Necessity, Re- 
sponsibility, Obligation, Equity, Reward, Pu- 
nishment, Merit,* we shall find, that they may 
be described. That is to say, we may mention 
the several simple notions which are included in 
them, and explain the manner in which they 
are connected together : some examples of what 
is meant have already been given in the last 
Chapter, where the notions expressed by the 
words Fluidity, Ductility, Organization, 
Virtue, are described, or analysed. 

It is now necessary to explain the meaning 
of the word — Analysis. 



# Some of these notions are often called Relative Notions ; 
Because they are formed by perceiving the Relation which 
one idea bears to another. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 57 



CHAP. IX. 

On Analysis, Classification, and Arrangement, 

To open a parcel, and to examine each 
article it contains separately, is Analysis. 

The word Analysis is often misunderstood, 
or used as if synonymous with Classification, 
or Arrangement, or Distribution, or Divi- 
sion : persons who have a happy talent for 
arranging their thoughts in a neat and per- 
spicuous manner, are apt to imagine that they 
have analysed a subject, when, in fact, they 
have done nothing more than put their original 
stock of ideas into some convenient and intel- 
ligible order. 

The difference between Analysis, Classifi- 
cation, and Arrangement, may be shewn by 
the following example : — 

A person who receives a parcel, containing 
a multitude of various articles, analyses it in 
order to know what each article is. 
d5 



58 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 

A tradesman who has to make up a parcel, 
which is to consist of various articles, if he is ac- 
customed to method in the dispatch of business, 
does not pass round his Warehouse and take by 
chance the articles which are contained in his 
customer's order ; but he first makes some kind 
of classification of them in his mind ; and then 
he proceeds to look out all the articles of a 
similar kind ; — then those of another kind ; &c. 

The person whose business it is to pack such 
a parcel, does not huddle them together at 
random ; but he makes an arrangement of 
them in the way which he thinks best for the 
compactness of the parcel, and the safety of 
the commodities. He classifies them, indeed, 
but not according to the real nature of the 
several articles ; it is merely with a view to his 
present object; which is to dispose them so 
that they may occupy the smallest possible 
space, with the least hazard of injury to any 
of the goods. Now if we attend to this ex- 
ample we shall perceive, that, — 

1. An analysis is made by observing the 
differences of things ; in order that, by se- 
parating things that differ, we may become 
perfectly acquainted with each ; and so with 
the whole. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 59 

2. A classification is made by regarding the 
resemblances of things ; in order that, by 
bringing together things that are alike, we 
may have a few kinds of things to think of, 
and remember, instead of a confused multi- 
tude of things. 

3. An arrangement is made by remarking 
particular circumstances which make it Jit that 
one thing should be placed along with another ; 
and that other things should be kept apart. 

1. We analyse in order to become acquainted 
with things of which hitherto we have been 
ignorant. 

2. We classify in order to have a just and 
comprehensive view of a multitude of ideas 
already acquired. 

3. We arrange in order to adapt a multitude 
of things to some particular purpose. 

1 . An analysis, therefore, must be perfect. 

2. A classification ought to be natural, and 
perspicuous. 

3. An arrangement ought to be simple, and 
Jit. 

1. There can be but one true analysis of any 
one collection of things. 



d6 



CO ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

2. There is always one classification which 
is best ; and that is the one which corresponds 
with a true analysis ; but there may be several 
classifications that are good. 

3. Several arrangements may be equally 
good ; because the fitness of an arrangement 
is often accidental and arbitrary. 

1. It may be observed that Persons who 
have the power of accurate discrimination 
among abstract notions, habits of patient 
thought, and, perhaps, a defective memory in 
regard to words, succeed best in analysis. 

2. That Persons who excel in the powers of 
observation, and who are more occupied with 
General notions than with Abstract notions, 
frame the best classifications. 

3. That the best arrangements are formed 
by persons whose apprehensions are the most 
rapid and distinct. 

There can be but one true analysis of any 
one collection of things ; because, in an 
analysis, we are not at liberty to divide 
things according to our pleasure, or according 
to the notions we may have formed of them 
beforehand ; but our business is simply, to 
learn by careful examination, how many dif- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 61 

f event things there are in the collection which 
we analyse. 

Suppose, for example, we designed to analyse 
some book, in order to form an index in which 
every paragraph should he referred to under a 
general head, according to the subject of which 
it treats : we might begin by taking half a 
dozen sheets of paper, — writing, as a title, 
upon the first, — Religion; upon the second, 
Morals; upon the third, Politics; upon the 
fourth, Natural Philosophy ; upon the fifth, 
Belles Letters ; and upon the sixth, Miscel- 
lanies. We might then proceed to read the 
book, and at the close of each paragraph con- 
sider on which of these six sheets we ought to 
put down the reference to it. There would be 
many paragraphs concerning which we should 
have no doubt under what head to place them ; 
but there would, probably, be some that could 
not with propriety be placed on any one of the 
first five sheets ; we should therefore put the 
reference to such paragraphs among the mis- 
cellanies : now the sheet of miscellanies, 
would, probably, be sooner filled than any 
one of the others ; but it would be a sheet full 
of confusion, — a mere heap of particulars^ 
which had not been analysed at alL 



62 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

The proper method of performing the task 
would be to have before us several sheets of 
blank paper ; we then read the first para- 
graph, — consider what is the subject to which 
it relates, — suppose, Politics . we make this 
word the title to one of the sheets, and put 
down the first reference upon it t in this way 
we proceed, — considering the subject of each 
paragraph separately ; and taking a fresh 
sheet of paper for every different subject, how 
many soever there may be ; probably we shall 
find that, instead of arranging the index under 
six heads, we must make twenty, or perhaps 
fifty. 

In making an analysis there are two opposite 
errors, often fallen into, both which proceed 
from the want of patient and accurate exami- 
nation. 

The first error is indolently to imagine that 
a multitude of things may be reduced to a very 
few different kinds. Thus, it was formerly 
supposed that there were but four Elements^ 
or different kinds of matter of which all things 
are composed ; — namely, — Fire, Air, Earth, 
and Water. Since men of science have ana- 
lysed matter with greater care, they have found 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 63 

that these are not Elements, but that there is a 
considerable number of simple substances. 

The second error happens when a number 
of things are supposed to be of different kinds, 
which more examination would show to be only 
different in appearance. Thus, for example, 
some modern chemists have said that there are 
more than twenty elements, or simple sub 
stances. Perhaps further examination will 
prove that several of these are the same sub- 
stance under a different form. 

We are liable to both these mistakes in 
analysing the notions or feelings of the mind ; 
and a great proportion of all false reasoning 
springs from one or the other of them. The 
manner in which complex abstract notions may 
be analysed remains now to be explained. 



64 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



CHAP. X. 

On the Analysis of Complex Abstract Notions. 

In Chapters VII. and VIII. the nature of 
abstract notions, and the difference between 
simple abstractions and complex abstractions 
were explained. 

Complex abstractions, it was said, are 
notions which consist of several simple ab- 
stractions joined together in the mind, or per- 
ceived to have some relation to each other. 

The notion of Liberty, for example, is a 
complex abstraction ^ because it is formed by 
perceiving the connection or relation of several 
simple notions, as, — 

1. The notion of Will or choice. 

2. The notion of action according to Will. 

3. The notion of some external force, op- 
posing this will, or action. 

And, 4th. these simple notions related to 
each other negatively, by the recollection that 
such force is absent from Will or action. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 65 

It is plain then that the notion of Liberty is 
a complex abstraction ; because we can men- 
tion the several notions which belong to it, and 
the relation in which they stand to each other. 
We can describe what we mean by the word 
without being obliged to find some other name 
for it : — Liberty, we may say, is the absence 
of external force or constraint, upon action or 
choice. 

But in order to describe this notion, we must 
first analyse it, or discover all the simple ideas 
of which it consists, and the manner of their 
being joined together. Now, in the cultivation 
of the understanding, nothing is more im- 
portant than to acquire the habit of analysing 
all complex abstract notions. 

It is this habit which is the chief distinction 
of an accurate, profound, and cultivated mind. 
A person who has not acquired this habit, when 
he is asked what he means when he uses a 
word which signifies a complex abstract notion, 
immediately hunts for some nearly synonymous 
term ; or if he cannot find one, he mentions 
some instance in which the word would com- 
monly be employed. If, for example, he is 
asked, — 6 what is Liberty ? ' he replies, per- 



66 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

haps, — e Liberty is freedom :' or he might say, 
c a man who is not in prison, has liberty*. Thus, 
because he is not able to analyse the notion 
expressed by this word, he is obliged to make 
the same sort of reply which he must have 
made if the question had related to some 
simple abstraction *, — he merely finds another 
name for the notion ; or he mentions where it 
is to be found. 

If we are asked what is redness, we can 
only say, it is crimson, or scarlet; or it is the 
colour of a rose, or of blood. Bat if the 
question relates to a complex abstraction, such 
as those mentioned page 56 we ought to 
analyse it, and then enumerate all the simple 
ideas of which it consists, and say how they 
are connected or related, so as to form one 
notion. 

Tf we attend to the way in which different 
men speak or write on philosophical, moral, or 
religious subjects, we shall perceive that there 
are three sorts of minds. 

The first class is the largest, by far, of the 
three ; it consists of those persons who, either 
have not naturally the power, or who have 
not acquired the habit of analysing complex 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 67 

notions. Such persons content themselves 
with using customary words, to which they 
attach confused, imperfect, or false notions. 
The acting of their minds in thinking is the 
mere recollection of words, phrases, and sen- 
tences, which they put together in various 
forms. 

The second class is much smaller than the 
first, but, perhaps, larger than the third. It 
consists of persons who, having more vivacity 
than clearness or strength of mind, are per- 
petually endeavouring to analyse simple ab- 
stract notions, such as those expressed by the 
words space, existence, thought, matter, 
pain, pleasure, power, wiU, fyc. This hap- 
pens because they do not perceive the difference 
between what is simple and what is complex : 
they imagine, therefore, that every thing is 
complex, and that all notions may be analysed. 
Such persons are best pleased with subjects 
which are most obscure : and they commonly 
seem unwilling to assent to any simple and 
perspicuous proposition : they amuse them- 
selves with useless, endless, and unintelligible 
disputes. They frequently invent new names 
for common ideas ; and often fancy that they 



68 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

have made wonderful discoveries, which, how- 
ever, nobody can understand : and sometimes 
they write books to prove, either, what really 
has no meaning at all, or what no one denies. 

The third Class consists of those who not 
only possess that activity of mind which incites 
them to think much, but also, that strength 
and accuracy of mind which enables them to 
perceive clearly what notions are simple, and 
what complex : they therefore, neither waste 
their time in trying to analyse notions that are 
simple ; nor rest satisfied till they have per- 
fectly analysed every notion that is complex. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



CHAP. XI. 

On Efforts of Abstraction of different kinds. 

It is commonly called an effort of abstraction 
by which the mind forcibly withdraws itself 
from the sensations occasioned by external 
objects ; while it attends to its own thoughts. 
It is also called an effort of abstraction when 
we attend to the objects perceived by one of 
the senses, while we cease to regard the objects 
perceived by the other senses : we may, for 
instance, so attend to what is before the eyes 
that we are scarcely conscious of sounds 
striking the ear at the same time. 

It is also by an effort of abstraction that the 
mind attends to one part of its sensations in 
the same organ, while it disregards the other 
parts. For example : — a Fainter acquires the 
habit of attending separately to the different 
sorts of sensations which are produced upon 
the retina at the same moment. He can at- 



70 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tend to the nice differences of colours, — their 
agreements and disagreements, without any 
regard to shadow, or to shape : or he per- 
ceives the varieties of shade, without regard to 
colour, or shape : or he measures the relations 
of shape, without regard to colour, or shade. 
It is upon the perfection of this power of ab- 
straction in the organ of sight that the talent 
of the Painter greatly depends. 

In like manner, the musician acquires the 
power of attending separately to any one of a 
multitude of sounds, which strike the ear at 
the same moment : he can listen to one part of 
the music, — the bass, the tenor, the treble ; or 
to one particular instrument^ or voice, among 
a hundred. 

The confectioner distinguishes by taste or 
smell the various ingredients which he has 
compounded ; and he can judge of the quality 
of some one ingredient although it is mingled 
upon the palate with five or six other ingre- 
dients. A good cook, or a great epicure, is 
able, when he tastes a made-dish, to discover 
all the ingredients of which it is composed : 
of one ingredient he may think there is not 
enough ; of another too much : another in- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 71 

gredient, he perceives, was not prepared with 
sufficient care ; of some other ingredient he 
will tell, whether it was produced in the West 
Indies or in China: now all these differences 
he perceives while one mixed taste is upon 
the palate. But, by an effort of abstraction, 
he attends to the various flavours separately 
and when he has attended thus to each, he 
has analysed the Dish. 

A good Painter, then, is able readily and 
certainly to analyse the complex sensations of 
sight. 

A good Musician can do the same with re- 
gard to the complex sensations of hearing, and 
a good cook analyses the complex sensations 
of taste. 

Now a good thinker is one who is able 
readily and certainly to analyse the complex 
abstract notions of the mind. 

All opinions on subjects connected with Mo- 
rals, Religion, Politics, or the Philosophy of 
Human Nature, consist of complex abstract 
notions, variously combined, and variously 
expressed in words. Opinions are formed by 
that operation of the mind which is called 
Reasoning. But before the mind is com- 



72 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

petent to Reason justly, it must have acquired 
habits of Abstraction and Analysis. Opinions 
which enter the mind in any other way are 
adopted, not formed; and they are little 
more than certain forms of expression, joined 
with feelings of complacency towards those 
who hold the same opinions, and of contempt 
or malevolence towards those who think, or 
rather, who speak differently. 

There is, however, one important exception 
to this general observation, very necessary to 
be remembered. This exception relates to 
those religious opinions which are indis- 
pensible to a holy state of mind — or, in other 
words to true virtue. Now these indispensible 
opinions, relative to the character of God — 
the moral condition of man, and the way in 
which he may be restored to virtue and happi- 
ness, are communicated to all who humbly and 
diligently seek for the guidance of God's Holy 
Spirit, in the perusal of his word, and the use 
of other means of instruction. This inesti- 
mable and necessary benefit is expressly pro- 
mised, in many parts of the Scriptures, to all 
who ask for it : and it is continually bestowed 
upon the most ignorant and uncultivated 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 73 

minds. Indeed, while such persons, being 
' taught of God,' receive the great principles of 
Christianity, those who proudly trust to the 
unaided powers of their understandings often 
reject or overlook the plainest doctrines of 
Scripture, and frame religious systems of their 
own, even though they profess to believe that 
the Bible is a Divine Revelation. 

It is not proposed in this volume to do more 
than explain the nature of those preparatory 
operations of the mind from which may result 
intelligent opinions, a sound judgement in 
conducting the common affairs of life, or a 
successful prosecution of philosophical in- 
quiries. Some brief hints, however, relating 
to the practical employment of the Intellectual 
Powers will be found in the following Part, 
under the words — Analogy, Argument, Be- 
lief, Contingency, Demonstration, Doubt, 
Experiment, Hypothesis, Induction, Infer- 
ence, Necessity, Probability, Reasoning, 
Suggestion, Testimony, Truth. 

END OF PART I. 



PART II. 



CONTAINING, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, BRIEF AND FAMILIAR 
EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TERMS EMPLOYED ON 
SUBJECTS RELATING TO THE NATURE AND OPERATIONS OF 
THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 



e2 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 77 



PART II. 

&c. 



Abstract, — Abstraction : from abstraho, 
to draw apart ; or to separate one thing 
from another. 

Abstraction is the action of the mind 
in thinking of some one quality or cir- 
cumstance belonging to several different 
things, while it pays no regard to the 
things themselves, or their other qualities : 
thus we think of length, without thinking 
of a road, or a wall, or a rope ; we can 
think of weight, apart from the idea of gold, 
or lead, or stone -, we may think of inno- 
cence, without recollecting any particular 
person, or thinking of any particular actions 
or course of conduct. 
e3 



78 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

A bstract terms are the names of qualities 
belonging to things which may, perhaps, be 
unlike each other in all respects, except this 
one quality : as a plum and a planet are 
unlike in all respects, except roundness : 
but General terms are the names of many 
individuals, alike in many, or in all their 
qualities and appearances : for example : — 
Speed is a quality which is found in a horse, 
an eagle, and a greyhound : the word speed, 
therefore, is an abstract term. But the word 
Lion is a General term ; because it is a 
name applied to all the individual animals 
of one sort. The word we use when we 
think of a quality, together with the parti- 
cular thing to which it belongs, is called a 
concrete term : blue, square, good, swift, 
are concrete terms ; because they require to 
be joined to the name of something, as the 
blue sky, a square building, a good man, a 
swift horse. 

See Chap. VI. and Common Terms — 
General Terms. 
Abstruse, from Abstrudo, to hide, or thrust 
out of sight ; or to shut up a thing. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 79 

Subjects that require a patient effort of the 
mind to understand them are called abstruse 
subjects ; they may be compared to metals, 
which lie hid in the bowels of the earth, and 
which must be dug thence with much labour. 
It is an inaccuracy frequent in conversa- 
tion, to use the words abstract and abstruse, 
as though they had the same meaning. 

Accident, from accido, to fall close by ; or to 
happen. 

An accident is a quality of a thing which is 
not found constantly to belong to it : as 
red heat, to iron ; fragrance, to a flower ; 
learning, to a man. 

Active and Passive. That which causes a 
change is Active. That which is changed 
by a cause is Passive. See page 22, and 
Cause. 

Adjunct, from adjunctum, joined to. 

The binding is an adjunct of a book : 
praise is an adjunct of virtue, or genius. An 
adjunct is a thing joined to some other thing : 
an accident is a quality of a thing. 

Affection, from affectio, which word is derived 
from officio, — to produce an effect upon 
something. 

e 4 



80 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

It is a general name applied to the 
qualities of things ; or the particular man- 
ner in which they exist; or the relations 
in which they stand to each other. The 
way in which we think makes it natural to 
us to imagine that all the properties or 
qualities of things are, as it were, fastened 
on to something to which they belong : we 
use the word substance therefore when we 
wish to express this indistinct notion ; and 
then all the qualities of that substance are 
called its affections or modes, A stick of 
sealing wax is smooth, hard, red, fragrant, 
and capable of being softened by heat. It 
has, also, a certain shape, size, and weight : 
besides these qualities with which we become 
acquainted by the senses of sight, touch, 
and smell ; we always imagine that there is 
a something which is the thing itself ; which 
possesses all these qualities ; and which we 
call substance ; while all that we actually 
know of it, is regarded as being only the 
qualities or affections of this Substance. 
See Substance. Mode. Being. Essence. 
Aggregate, from aggrego, to gather together 
as a flock of sheep. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. SI 

The word is used to denote a number of 
x things which may be thought of, as if they 
made but one thing ; though they are 
really distinct, and often found separate. 
This notion may serve as an example of an 
abstract relation, which corresponds with 
nothing that is to be found in things them- 
selves, but which results entirely from our 
manner of thinking of them. When we 
speak of a flock of sheep, the words repre- 
sent nothing but our notion of a number of 
things, which, on some account, we imagine 
to form one thing. 
Agreement. When we compare two or more 
things and perceive them to be alike in some 
respect, we use the word agreement : when 
things are perfectly alike, we express the 
comparison by the word sameness. These 
are both complex abstract notions of relation. 
Analogy, from avuhoyiu — proportion: When 
some course of events seems to follow the 
same order with another; so that we may 
imagine them to be influenced by similar 
causes ; we say there is an analogy between 
them. And when we infer that a certain 
event will take place in one case, which we 
e5 



82 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



have observed to take place in some other 
case, of a similar nature, we are said tb 
reason from analogy. For example : — 
when it was observed that rice nourishes in 
the hot and humid plains of Egypt, it was by 
reasoning from analogy that it was supposed 
it would be advantageously cultivated in the 
sultry marshes of Carolina. We reason 
from analogy, when we suppose that the 
Stars, like the Sun are surrounded with 
Planets, which derive from them light and 
heat. When we see that every part of the 
Earth's surface, and every drop of water is 
crowded with animated beings, we reason 
from analogy, when we suppose that God, 
who has thus filled one part of his Universe 
with creatures, has done the same in other 
parts ; and that therefore the Planets and 
the more distant systems are filled with 
living creatures. 
Analysis, from uvaxvoo to untie, unloose, or 
separate one part of a thing from another. 
Almost every thing with which we are ac- 
quainted consists of different parts or 
qualities, united together : in most cases 
we do not distinguish these different parts or 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 83 

qualities of things without some degree of 
attention or examination : thus, when we 
look at water it appears to be one simple 
substance; but when it is examined by a 
chemical process, it is found to be formed 
by the union of two sorts of air. In like 
manner atmospheric air is found to be com- 
posed of three sorts of air. This kind of 
examination which discovers what any sub- 
stance is composed of, is called an analysis. 
We may analyse our thoughts, or the feelings 
of our minds, as well as material substances. 
Suppose, for example, the idea of some 
building which we have formerly seen is pre- 
sent to our minds : if we analyse our 
thoughts, we shall find that, besides the 
image of the building, we have a feeling or 
conviction along with it of having actually 
seen the object at some former time. When 
an image in the mind is joined with this 
feeling, we call it memory. The image 
which is before our minds is joined also with 
some feeling of pleasure, or displeasure, 
according to the circumstances we might be 
in when we saw the building. Now all these 
sensations are so closely joined together in 
e6 



84 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the mind, that they seem to form one simple 
notion, or remembrance, till we examine our 
thoughts more accurately, and distinguish 
one feeling and one image from another. 

In order to become acquainted with the na- 
ture of any object, we must first think of it 
with a wish to know more of its nature than 
we can perceive at the first glance ; this is 
Curiosity. This wish to know, makes us 
forcibly keep our thoughts upon the object 
for some length of time : this is Attention. 
We then endeavour to think of the different 
parts, properties, or qualities of the object 
singly, and apart from the idea we have of 
the whole : this is Abstraction. When we 
have considered all the parts, properties, or 
qualities of the object, one after another, 
so that we can think of them separately and 
distinctly, we have then analysed the object : 
that is to say, we have separated from each 
other all the tilings in which we can perceive 
any difference. 

See Synthesis, Complex; and Chap. IX. 

Argument. A proposition which may be 

proved to be certainly true ; so that no one 

who understands what is affirmed, can doubt 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 85 

it, is said to be demonstrable : and the way 
of showing such a proposition to be true, is 
called a demonstration. But when a pro- 
position is of such a nature that the truth of 
it cannot be made to appear absolutely 
certain, then the reasons that are given to 
prove it true are called arguments. Argu- 
ments may be balanced one against another ; 
and when we have considered all of them, 
we believe that proposition to be true which 
is supported by the best arguments : and we 
ought to believe it more or less confidently 
in proportion to the strength of the argu 
ments. Arguments make a proposition pro- 
bable ; and we believe what is probable : 
but demonstration makes a proposition cer- 
tain ; and we are said to know, not merely 
to believe what is proved by demonstration. 
It may be demonstrated that the three angles 
of every triangle are equal to two right 
angles. This is a truth We know, as soon 
as we understand what is meant by the words. 
It may be proved by good arguments that 
there is a city called Pekin in China: and it 
would be foolish to doubt this, although, 
strictly speaking, it cannot be demonstrated 



86 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

to be true to those who have never visited 
China. It may be proved to be probable 
that there is a north West Passage from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific ocean ; but this is not 
yet so certainly proved, as that it would be 
foolish to doubt it : a year hence, perhaps, 
the question may be determined : But what 
is once known by demonstration cannot be 
made more certain by any new proofs : while 
what is proved by arguments may be more 
or less certain. Many things, however, are 
so well proved by arguments, that no reason- 
able person will doubt them. 

This is the meaning of the word argu- 
ments it respects the different ways in which 
a proposition may be proved to be true. In 
common use the word is often intended to 
express, besides the mere reasons that may 
be brought to prove what is affirmed, those 
earnest endeavours which one person makes 
to persuade others to be of his opinion, by 
exciting his feelings on the subject ; and so 
biasing his Judgement. 

In subjects which do not admit of Demon- 
stration, such as those which afford the 
most usual topics of conversation, almost any 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 87 

proposition may appear to be proved by 
arguments. This is, in part, owing to the 
uncertainty of language, which conceals the 
fallacies of bad reasoning. It is also, in 
great measure, owing to the confused and 
careless habits of thinking, with which most 
people are satisfied. In those discussions 
which frequently arise in conversation, it 
very commonly happens that the several 
parties adduce various arguments without 
having any clear or fixed apprehension of 
the notions contained in the propositions they 
maintain. From such debates little ad- 
vantage is likely to result. He who is most 
fluent, or most crafty, or most dogmatical, 
may put his opponent to silence ; and may 
appear to have overthrown his arguments : 
but, in fact, all that the victor has gained is 
a sort of triumphant confidence in the affir- 
mation of some half dozen empty sentences ; 
while all that the conquered party has lost is 
his present persuasion of the truth of some 
other half dozen of empty sentences. In 
most cases, if both parties were constrained 
to analyse every complex notion connected 
with the disputed question, (see Chap. X.) 



88 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

they would either find that there was no real 
or important disagreement in their opinions ; 
or the true nature of the point in dispute 
would become so apparent that no further 
argument would be needed ; or, very pro- 
bably, it would become manifest that neither 
party possessed a twentieth part of the know- 
ledge which could qualify them to form any 
opinion on the subject. 

See Reasoning. Probability. Demon- 
stration. 
Arrangement. To arrange things, is not to 
separate and place them in order according 
to their true nature ; but in such a way as 
will best suit some particular purpose. Thus, 
if we place the books in a library, not accord- 
ing to the subjects of which they treat, but 
merely with a view to our convenience in 
reaching those which we most often want to 
use, this is an arrangement, not a classifi- 
cation. Thus also, it may often be useful 
to arrange our thoughts, not according to a 
just method of thinking; but in that order 
which may seem most likely to produce the 
particular effect which we wish upon the 
minds of those to whom we speak. See 



elements of thought. b\) 

Disposition. Classification. Method. 
Order, and Chap. IX. 
Art, is the knowledge of what must be done 
to produce some particular effect. The word 
is only applied to those cases where con- 
siderable application of the mind is required 
to learn what is to be done* We do not use 
the word when we speak of the most com- 
mon occupations ; because, all that is neces- 
sary to be known in order to produce the 
required effect is easily learnt : Science 
is that sort of knowledge which does 
not immediately relate to practice : for 
example : — The knowledge of the different 
elements of all bodies, and the effects they 
produce upon each other, constitutes the 
Science of Chemistry. The same sort of 
knowledge, when it is applied to any prac- 
tical purpose is called an Art ; as, for in- 
stance, the art of Dying ; the art of Brewing ; 
the art of preparing Drugs for medical uses ; 
&c. Men first learn Arts ; because they are 
obliged to provide for the various wants of 
animal life. When nations are so far civilized 
that many individuals have leisure, then 
curiosity impels them to seek for knowledge, 



90 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

merely for the pleasure which it yields. The 
knowledge which such persons acquire for 
their own pleasure, is soon after applied to 
the discovery of better methods of producing 
or preparing the different necessaries and 
conveniences of life. Thus it is that the 
practice of the Arts improves the condition 
of men so far that many are left at leisure to 
think; and then, those who think become 
qualified to direct and improve the practice 
of those who labour. Thus the Arts produce 
the Sciences ; and then Science improves 
the Arts. See Theory. 
Artificial ; that which is produced by art. 
There are some of the operations of nature 
which are so far within the power of man 
that he can regulate or alter the effects pro- 
duced by natural causes : the effects that are 
thus produced are called artificial. By 
grafting one sort of fruit tree upon another, 
a better kind of fruit is produced than either 
of the trees would have yielded if left to 
itself : this is an artificial process. The 
word artificial is not applied to those things 
which are produced entirely by the skill and 
labour of men ; as, for instance, a house, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 91 

or a watch : these are called works of art. 
It is only properly employed when the usual 
course of nature is altered by skill or labour. 
The word is often improperly applied to 
things that are mere imitations of the works 
of nature, as artificial flowers, or fruit. 

Association. If several thoughts, or ideas, 
or feelings have been in the mind at the 
same time, afterwards, if one of these 
thoughts return to the mind, some, or all 
of the others will frequently return with it : 
this is called the association of ideas. 

Attention. When we see, hear, or think of 
any thing, and feel a desire to know more of 
it, we keep the mind fixt upon the object : 
this effort of the mind, produced by the 
desire of knowledge, is called Attention. 
Ideas or feelings are constantly moving 
through the mind without our will : (see 
page 19) : but when we will, we have the 
power to stop them, and choose which shall 
stay in the mind. Now a sluggish mind is 
one in which the desire of knowledge is not 
great enough to rouse attention on ordinary 
occasions. A weak mind is one in which, 
though there may be much desire of know- 



92 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ledge — or curiosity, there is not force enough 
to fix or command the thoughts. The vigour 
of the mind greatly depends upon the just 
balance between the desire of knowledge and 
that force in which consists the power of 
attention. Whether the mind be naturally 
strong, or weak, or sluggish, education 
tends to increase the power of attention ; or, 
in other words, to give it more command of 
its thoughts — more active Power, than it 
would otherwise have. See page 21. 

Attribute, from attribuo, to give to, or im- 
pute. When one thing or quality is said to 
belong to or make part of another, that 
thing or quality is called an attribute. — See 
Subject. 

Axiom, from «fiwjtt«, a sentence, or affirmation, 
worthy to be received. 

This word is applied to simple propositions 
so evidently true that they do not need to be 
proved ; such, for instance, as — That the 
whole of any thing is greater than any part 
of it. 

Being. This is the name of a simple abstract 
notion, resulting from our consciousness, 
which cannot therefore be denned. Consi- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 93 

dered as a General term, it is the most com- 
prehensive of all General terms : whatever 
is, or exists, is called a Being. It may 
therefore be applied to God in common "with 
his creatures : God is : or God exists; He 
is emphatically called the Supreme Being ; 
or the Divine Being. 
Belief. The state of mind produced by 
arguments or reasons which appear to be 
good or sufficient, is called Belief, See the 
word Argument. 

Belief is a state of mind between Know- 
ledge and Doubt, in relation to the truth of 
some proposition. Although what we believe 
is not to us so absolutely certain as what we 
know, yet it is as truly unreasonable not to 
believe what is proved in the highest degree 
probable, as it would be absurd to pretend to 
doubt propositions that have been demon- 
strated. For example : We should think a 
person deficient in common sense, or ex- 
tremely ignorant, who should profess not to 
believe that Paradise Lost was written by 
John Milton* It would be scarcely less ab- 
surd not to believe that the CEneid was 
written by Virgil, in the reign of Augustus : 



94 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

yet neither of these propositions can be de- 
monstrated to be true; therefore, although 
it would be extremely absurd to doubt them, 
we must not say that we know them to be 
true. But if we will not believe these his- 
torical propositions, we must, in order to 
account for the facts on which the common 
opinion is founded, 'pretend to believe that 
of which no reasonable and well-informed 
person could actually convince himself if he 
were to try. 

If it is affirmed that the Moon is inhabited 
by animals and intelligent creatures, we 
may doubt this ; because we have no direct 
proof that it is so : there is, therefore, no- 
thing absurd in supposing that the Moon is 
uninhabited ; although an argument from 
analogy is strongly in favour of the supposi- 
tion. But if it were said that the island of 
Madagascar is uninhabited, we could not 
believe this without admitting the most 
absurd suppositions :— we must believe that 
thousands of persons, of different nations, 
during four hundred years, who have visited 
the island, have all agreed to tell the same 
falsehood; and that without any reason for 
doing so : this is incredible. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 95 

There is one difference between what we 
know and what we believe, which it is impor- 
tant to understand. Propositions which we 
know to be true, we entirely understand ; or 
at least, so far as we may be said really to 
know them, we also understand them. But 
we must believe many things of which we 
scarcely understand any thing. For ex- 
ample : — Three taken three times amounts 
to nine. We know that this is true : — by 
one glance of the mind we can, as it were, 
see that it is true ; we, therefore, perfectly 
understand what is meant by the words, 
when we say that three times three are nine. 
But let us suppose that a person who is 
acquainted only with the common rules of 
arithmetic, wants to resolve some problem 
belonging to the higher branches of the 
mathematics : he reads the rules which relate 
to the problem ; and he carefully follows the 
directions which are given. First he mul- 
tiplies ; — then he divides ; — then he sub- 
stracts ; — then he multiplies again ; and so 
on : but he has not the least notion of the 
reason of all these operations which he is 
-directed to perform : he cannot, therefore, 



) ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

know that what he does is right, nor can he 
trace the method by which a true result is 
produced ; yet, as he believes that the Rules 
he has followed are right, he believes, also, 
that the sum which these calculations produce 
is the true answer to the problem. 

The greater part of all the Sciences is be- 
lieved, and not known, by those who learn 
them from books or teachers. And in the 
most important concerns of life, men are ob- 
liged to act upon what they believe, not upon 
what they know : as, for example ; when a 
merchant sends a cargo of goods to a distant 
country, he does not know that there is any 
such country as that to which the Captain 
undertakes to conduct the Ship. He does 
not know that there is any such person as 
the merchant to whom the cargo is to be 
delivered ; much less does he know that this 
merchant is able to pay for the goods, and 
honest enough to do so ; and yet, as he has 
reason to believe all these things, he does 
not scruple to venture half his fortune upon 
the truth of them. 

In the same way, we cannot, in the present 
state, know that there is a judgement to come, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 97 

and a future life. But yet, if so momentous 
a truth may be compared to one of small im- 
portance, it is as absurd to doubt of this, as it 
would be not to believe that there is such 
an Island as Madagascar, and that it is 
inhabited. And it is as truly irrational not 
to regulate all our conduct in the present 
life by a regard to our welfare in the future 
world, as it would be in a merchant, to send 
a ship to sea laden with a precious cargo, 
without provisions, without charts, and 
without a compass. 

The things which we may know, are 
generally of much less importance to our 
welfare, either in the present life, or in the 
life to come, than the things which are 
believed. 
Cause. We are conscious of being able to 
change the thoughts in our own minds, as we 
will , and also to change the position or state 
of our bodies, and in some degree, the posi- 
tion or state of things about us, as we will. 
This feeling of being able to change the 
state of things, according to our will, gives 
us a notion which we call Power : now any 
thing which has really, or which seems to 

F 



98 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

have power to change the state of other 
things, is called a Cause : the change that 
takes place is called an Effect. 

When we have observed that one event 
constantly takes place immediately, or soon 
after some other event, we cannot avoid be- 
lieving that the first event has produced that 
which follows : therefore we commonly call 
the first event a cause, and the second, an 
effect. For example : when we see that, 
soon after the rising of the Sun, the hoar 
frost dissolves ; or that the petals of flowers 
expand, we say that the Sun is the Cause, — 
and that the melting of the frost, or the 
opening of the flowers is the Effect of this 
cause. 

If we were to observe that a clock had 
stopped at sun -set, we should take no par- 
ticular notice of the circumstance ; but if it 
were constantly to stop at sun-set, we 
should suppose that the setting of the sun 
was the cause of the stopping of the clock : 
and if all clocks always stopped at sun-set, 
we should not be able to doubt that the light 
of the Sun was, in some way, the cause of 
the motion of clocks ; although we could not 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



find out how the sun acted upon the wheels, 
so as to produce this effect. 

We see therefore that it is natural to us, 
whenever we see any change take place in 
the state of things, to believe that there is 
something which has the Power to produce 
this change, and which we call the cause of 
it. It is also equally natural to us to believe 
that, when two events constantly takes place, 
one immediately after the other, the first 
of them is the cause of the second. 
See Effect, and page 22. 
Classification. The mind feels burdened 
and confused when it attempts to think of a 
multitude of things : but when we can put 
a multitude of things into a few parcels or 
bundles, we can then make ourselves ac- 
quainted with them all more easily, and more 
perfectly, and remember them with greater 
facility. The sorting a multitude of things 
into parcels, for the sake of knowing them 
better, and remembering them more easily, 
is classification. 

When we attempt to classify a multitude 
of things, we observe some respects in which 
they differ from each other ; — for we could 
f2 



100 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

not classify things that are entirely alike ; as 
a bushel of peas, for instance : we then 
separate the things that are unlike, and 
bring together the things that are similar. 

The same things may be classified in dif- 
ferent ways : for example : — A collection of 
Books may be classified according to the 
subjects of which they treat, — Theology, 
History, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, 
&c. or they may be classified alphabetically, 
according to the names of their Authors : or 
they may be classified according to their 
size, — as Folios, Quartos, Octavos, &c. 

See Analysis. Arrangement. Disposi- 
tion. Method, and Chap IX. 

Common terms, or names, are words which 
are applied to all the things which are alike 
in certain respects. Triangle is the name 
of every figure that is formed by the joining 
of three lines. See Abstract Terms. 
General Terms ; and Chap. IV. 

Complex. That which consists of several 
different things, so put together as to form 
a whole, is called complex. Complex things 
are the subjects of analysis. The analysis 
of complex notions is one of the first and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 101 

most important exercises of the understand- 
ing. See Analysis, and Chap. X. 

Conception, is the forming or bringing an 
image or idea into the mind, by an effort 
of the will. It is distinguished from Sen- 
sation and Perception — produced by an 
object present to the senses : and from 
Imagination, which is the joining together 
of ideas in new ways : it is distinguished 
from Memory by not having the feeling of 
past time connected with the idea. 

Conclusion. When something is simply 
affirmed to be true, it is called a Propo- 
sition ; after it has been proved to be true, 
by several reasons or arguments, it is called 
a Conclusion. — < Sloth and prodigality will 
bring a man to want :' — this is aProposition : 
after all the arguments have been mentioned 
which prove this to be true, we say, ' there- 
fore sloth and prodigality will bring a man 
to want :' this is now the Conclusion. See 
Reasoning. Inference. 

Concrete, from concresco, to be formed into 

one mass. When a quality is spoken of as 

joined to the thing to which it belongs, the 

word used is called a concrete term, as 

f3 



102 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

white paper, equitable conduct. White- 
ness, Equity, are abstract terms. 
See Abstract. 

Consciousness. This is a general name for 
all our feelings taken together ; or it signifies 
the feeling we have when we look inwards 
upon our own minds : it is as if the mind 
looked in a mirror and saw itself. The 
mind is constantly occupied with some sen- 
sation, or some image, or some feeling ; and 
generally, it is engaged only with the sen- 
sation, or image, or feeling ; but sometimes 
there is also a notion of itself, haying such a 
feeling, or sensation, or thought ; this is 
called consciousness. 

Contingent, from contingo, to touch ; to hit; 
to happen. 

When any event takes place which seems 
to us to have no cause, why it should happen 
in one way, rather than another, it is called 
a contingent event : as, for example ; the 
falling of a leaf on a certain spot; or the 
turning up of any particular number, when 
the dice are thrown. In reality, nothing 
happens by chance : or, to speak more pro- 
perly, chance is a word which has no real 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 103 

meaning, except it be taken as a convenient 
name for our ignorance of the cause of some 
effect. If we see a leaden bullet fall to the 
ground, we know beforehand that it will 
fall on the spot perpendicularly under it ; 
because we know it to be influenced only by 
the attraction of gravity ; and therefore, 
when it actually falls where we had expected 
it to fall, we do not say that it fell there by 
chance ; for we think that it could not have 
fallen any where else. But when we see a 
leaf fall, we cannot tell beforehand where it 
will alight upon the ground ; because it is 
influenced by changing currents of air, as well 
as by the attraction of gravity ; therefore we 
imagine that it falls where it does by chance : 
and its falling on one spot, or on another, 
is called a contingent event. But this way 
of speaking only means that we cannot tell 
beforehand how the thing will happen. 
Nothing comes to pass without a cause. 

The rising of the Sun to-morrow is not 
called a contingent event ; because we con- 
sider it as certain. The fineness of the day 
we think contingent ; because we cannot 
foretel tlxe state of the weather ; but if we 
f4 



104 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

knew all the causes which influence the state 
of the atmosphere, and how they follow each 
other, so as to produce rain, or drought ; then 
we should no longer speak of a fine day as an 
accidental or contingent event; because it 
would always take place according to our 
expectation. See Necessity. 

Data, the plural of datum, — a thing given, 
or granted. Those facts from which an 
inference is drawn, are called data : for 
example : — it has always been found that 
the inhabitants of temperate climates have 
excelled those of very hot or very cold 
climates, in Stature, Strength, and Intelli- 
gence : these facts are the data, from which 
it is inferred, that excellence of Body and of 
Mind depend, in some measure, upon the 
temperature of the climate. See Inference. 

Definition. To define a thing is to mention 
something which marks or distinguishes it 
infallibly from things that are similar to it. 

One mark or difference is enough for a 
definition, if it makes it impossible to mistake 
what is meant. In making a definition, we 
first mention the name which belongs to all 
the things that are nearly like the object to 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 105 

be defined ; and then we mention that par- 
ticular circumstance in which it is unlike 
those other things that are called by the 
same general name. Sometimes several 
definitions, more and more particular, are 
required to make a thing known. Thus ; 
an Elephant is an Animal having four legs. 
The word animal belongs to all things that 
grow and move from place to place : we 
then distinguish it from other animals, by 
saying, that it has four legs : this shows that 
it is not a Fish, a Bird, or a Reptile. But 
there are many animals besides Elephants, 
that have four legs ; therefore we must find 
another more particular definition : we say, 
then, that an Elephant is a quadruped — 
having a long and pliable trunk projecting 
from its nose : — this is a mark or distinction 
which will make it known from all other 
quadrupeds. A definition does not represent 
a thing to the mind, as a picture does to the 
eye : such a representation made by words 
is called a description. See page 42. 

The definition of words is different from 
the definition of things. Certain words 
come to signify certain things by use or 
f5 



106 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

custom ; but use or custom, in language, as 
in all other things, is liable to be changed by 
time and accident. Besides : few men speak 
accurately, and fewer still think clearly ; 
Hence, there is much confusion and mistake 
in the signification of many words. When, 
therefore, we wish to avoid mistake, as far as 
it is possible in conveying our meaning to 
other men's minds, it is necessary to inform 
them in what sense we use words. That is 
to say, — we give definitions of words by 
giving descriptions of the things which we 
intend to signify by them. The definition of 
words is most necessary where words are 
employed by different persons in very dif- 
ferent senses. For example : — the word 
virtue, is used, sometimes to signify courage 
and fortitude ; sometimes, a freedom from 
gross offences against temperance, or justice ; 
sometimes, real goodness ; which consists in 
the love of God, and of our fellow-creatures. 
If then, we think it probable that those to 
whom we speak will understand the word 
virtue, in one sense, while we use it in 
another, it will be necessary to define the 
word, which is done by describing the thing 
we intend to signify by it. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 107 

Demonstration. To demonstrate, is to show, 
or to make evident. 

When we have a perfect view, or a perfect 
understanding of two objects, — so that their 
likeness or the difference between them 
appears at once, we feel sure that we cannot 
mistake in what we say concerning them. 
If it is said that twice three are six, we can, 
as it were, see that this is true ; we know it 
to be true ; or if it be said, that twice three 
are seven, we know that this is not true, 
Propositions that are absolutely certain and 
evident at once, are usually called Axioms. 
Propositions that are absolutely certain, but 
which comprise too many particulars to be 
evident at once, are said to be proved by 
demonstration. We are obliged, on account 
of the imperfection of our minds, to attend 
to all the particulars contained in the pro- 
position, one by one : and each of these 
particulars is some axiom that we perceive 
to be true at once. For example : if it is 
affirmed that 438 times 541, are equal to 
236958, — this is a proposition that is abso- 
lutely certain ; but it is not evident at once j 
because it contains more particulars than 
f6 



108 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

the mind can comprehend in a moment; 
therefore we are obliged to make it evident 
to ourselves, by attending to each particular 
singly : we aid our narrow powers of thought 
by what is called a series of demonstrations. 
When we have paid sufficient attention to 
each particular in such a process, we feel 
as sure of the truth of this complex pro- 
position as we do of the truth of the 
simplest axiom. It makes no difference in 
the certainty of a proposition, whether the 
process necessary to demonstrate it be long 
or short. It may require a long process 
to demonstrate that an Eclipse of the Moon 
will take place at such, or such an instant, 
a hundred years hence ; yet this may be 
proved as certainly as that 3 times 9 are 27 ; 
because, though there are many particulars, 
following each other, every one is absolutely 
certain, and the connexion between them is 
also certain. See Belief. Reasoning. 

The word demonstration, ought only to 

be used where it signifies the showing of 

things which may be known certainly. 

Design. What is done, neither by accident, 

nor simply for its own sake, but with a view 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 109 

to some effect that is to follow, is said to be 
the result of design. None but intelligent 
beings act with design ; because it requires 
knowledge, and the power of comparing 
ideas, to conceive of some end or object to 
be produced, and to devise the means pro- 
per to produce the effect. Therefore, when- 
ever we see a thing which not only may be 
.applied to some use, but which is evidently 
made for the sake of the effect which it pro- 
duces, we feel sure that it is the work of a 
being capable of thought. If, in travelling 
through an uninhabited country, we were to 
find a tree lying across a deep and rapid 
stream, in such a way that we could pass 
across upon it, we should merely think that, 
having formerly grown on the bank, it had 
been blown down by the wind : but if we 
were to find two trees laid across the stream, 
and tied together, we should feel sure that 
this must be the effect of thought, not of 
accident. In the same way, when we per- 
ceive in every natural ubject, all the parts 
fitted in the best way to produce certain 
effects, we feel sure that what we see is the 
work of an intelligent Being. 



110 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Disposition. To dispose things, is to plaee 
them in some order, for the sake of conveni- 
ence. A good disposition of our thoughts, 
upon any subject, is such a manner of placing 
them as will make them most readily under- 
stood by others, or most easily retained in 
the memory. It is a common mistake for 
persons to suppose that, to arrange, or 
dispose their thoughts, is the same as to 
analyse them. 

See Analysis. Arrangement. Classi- 
fication. 

Distinction. A distinction is the expressing 
in words, some difference which has been 
perceived between two or more things. 

Distribution, is the placing particular things 
in the places or compartments which have 
been already prepared to receive them. 
When we have arranged or disposed our 
thoughts in a certain order, and afterwards 
other thoughts occur to us, we distribute 
them according to the same plan. 
See Arrangement. Disposition. 

Division, is the separating things of the same 
kind into parcels : analysis is the separation 
of things that are of different kinds ; we 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. Ill 

divide a stick by cutting it into two, or into 
twenty pieces : we analyse it, by separating 
the bark, the wood, and the pith — a Divi- 
sion may be made at pleasure, an analysis 
may not. 

See Analysis. 
Doubt, is some degree of belief, along with 
the consciousness of ignorance, in regard to 
a proposition. Absolute disbelief implies 
Knowledge : — It is the knowledge that such 
or such a thing is not true. If the mind 
admits a proposition without any desire for 
knowledge concerning it, this is credulity. 
If it is open to receive the proposition, 
but feels ignorance concerning it, this is 
doubt. In proportion as knowledge in- 
creases, doubt diminishes, and belief, or 
disbelief, strengthens. 

No one ought to profess to disbelieve any 
proposition, unless he is sure that he per- 
fectly understands the subject to which it 
relates. To do so is the most absurd pre- 
sumption. Those who profess to doubt the 
truth of important propositions, thereby 
acknowledge their ignorance ; they ought, 
therefore, not to rest till they have sought 
information by every possible means. 



112 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Duration. When any thought, or feeling", 
or image, ceases to engage the principal 
attention of the mind, we do not part with 
it instantaneously, and entirely ; but it 
seems, like the objects on the road side when 
we are travelling, to keep in sight, while 
other objects are immediately before us i 
thus we acquire the notion of succession. 
After some thought has entirely disappeared 
from the mind, it will often return, joined 
with the feeling that it has been in the mind 
before: this feeling is what is called Memory. 
Memory gives us the notion signified by the 
word duration. Time is duration measured 
into equal parts. 

Effect, is some change produced by a being 
that has Power. That which exerts power 
is called a Cause. See Cause. 

Essence. All the properties or qualities with- 
out which a thing could not exist, or without 
which it would be entirely altered, make up 
what is called the essence of a thing. Three 
lines joining, make the essence of a triangle : 
if one is removed, what remains is no longer 
triangle. A living body, joined to a reason- 
able soul, make the essence of a human 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 113 

being. Sheets of paper, covered with 
writing, or printing, and fastened together, 
are the essence of a book. Besides the 
qualities that make a thing what it is, there 
are other qualities which may be added or 
taken away, without changing or destroying 
the essence of it; as, for example, the 
binding to a book ; or health, learning, 
goodness, to a man ; these qualities are 
called Adjuncts. See Nature. 

Evidence. When facts which are already 
known or believed to be true, are mentioned 
in order to prove some other fact to be true, 
such facts are called evidence. 

Existence, means the same as Being. 
That which is, is said to be, or to have 
existence. See Being. 

Experiment. If we attend to what takes 
place around us, with a view to gain know- 
ledge, we are said to learn by observation. 
When we put causes in operation with 
design to try what effect will follow, we 
learn by experiment. It is natural to us to 
believe that every change we see in the state 
of things is produced by some cause : it is 
also natural to us to desire to know the 



114 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

causes of all the effects which we observe. 
Now there are two ways of learning the 
causes of things ; one is by watching effects 
carefully, and often : the other is by first 
guessing what the cause of an effect may be, 
and then trying whether it is really so : this 
last method is called experiment. The 
guess, or supposition which we make before 
we try experiments, is called an hypothesis. 
It has been observed that thunder storms 
usually follow dry and hot weather ; we 
believe, therefore, that the dryness and 
heat of the atmosphere are, in some way, 
the cause of thunder and lightning : this 
we learn by observation. Dr. Franklin 
guessed that lightning is the same fluid 
which is produced by rubbing amber, called 
the electric fluid : this was his hypothesis ; 
in order to find if his hypothesis were true, 
he flew a kite in a thunder storm, having a 
small wire along with the string. When the 
thunder cloud passed over the kite, he drew 
sparks from the lower end of the wire, which 
had all the appearances and properties of 
those produced by an electrical machine : 
this was an experiment ; and it proved that 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 115 

his hypothesis was true. See Hypothesis. 
Induction. 

Extension. The notions acquired by the 
sense of touch, and by the movement of the 
body, compared with what is learnt by the 
eye, make up the idea expressed by the 
word extension. When we think of many 
feelings, — one coming as the other goes, we 
have the notion of Duration : When we 
think of many feelings in the senses of touch 
or sight, existing at the same moment, we 
have the notion of Extension. 

Fact. If we speak of the changes which 
take place in the state of things, with a view 
to inquire into the causes which produce 
them, we call them facts : after we suppose 
that we have discovered their causes, we 
call them Effects. 

General Terms, express the notions which 
are formed in the mind after having per- 
ceived a number of objects, nearly resembling 
each other. It is commonly only a faint or 
confused idea which passes through the 
mind when we employ General terms. 

See Abstraction. Common names ; and 
Chapter IV. 



116 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Genus and Species. See Chapter V. 
Hypothesis, from wroQsws, — a supposition. 

See Experiment. 

Experiments made with the intention of 
discovering the causes of effects would be 
endless, and, for the most part, fruitless, 
unless they were directed by probable sup- 
positions, or hypotheses. An hypothesis is 
formed upon some degree of knowledge 
acquired by observation, or experience, or 
former experiments. Every advance in 
knowledge affords ground for further 
hypotheses, to be followed by new ex- 
periments. 

We observe that one spot in a meadow 
produces much stronger and better grass 
than the rest of the field : we remember that 
a heap of rubbish and litter, consisting of 
various matters, had lain for some time upon 
that spot. Now, supposing that we were 
entirely ignorant of the nature and use of 
manures, our first guess, or hypothesis, 
perhaps, would be, that the cause of the 
productiveness of this spot was merely its 
having been covered up from the air for 
some time : on this supposition, therefore^ 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 117 

we try an experiment, by covering another 
spot with rubbish, for the same time : but we 
find that the same effect is not produced in 
this case. We next imagine that it must 
have been the qualities of some article in 
the first heap, which was the cause of the 
fertility of the spot. We examine the heap, 
and find that it consisted of ashes, sea weed, 
and rotten vegetables : we therefore lay a 
parcel of each of the ingredients, separately, 
upon different spots : and if we afterwards 
observe that the spot on which the sea weed 
had been placed, was the most fertile, we 
conclude that that was the true or principal 
cause of the effect we had noticed. This is 
the way in which all useful knowledge of the 
laws of nature is acquired ; First, we notice 
facts ; then we guess what may be the 
causes of these facts : then we try experi- 
ments, or make observations, in order to 
prove whether our hypothesis be true : when 
we have proved it true, we have learned, 
what is called a general law : that is to say, 
we have discovered that such or such a 
thing will always be followed by such or 
such an effect : or, in other words, that 



118 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

two things, — one called cause, and the other 
effect, always happen together. 

Idea. This word is often employed to signify 
any kind of thought. Its more proper 
meaning is a thought of some object which 
we have before perceived ; — such a thought 
as may be called an image of an object in 
the mind. The mind is able to join together 
ideas, so as to form images of things which 
it has never actually seen : this joining of 
ideas is called Imagination. Thus we can 
imagine a silvery tree, bearing golden 
fruit : or a horse, flying with wings through 
the air. When these joined ideas are of a 
kind to give pleasure to the mind, they are 
called poetical images. 

Identity, means sameness. What is called 
Personal Identity, is our being the same 
persons from the commencement to the end 
of life ; while the matter of the body, the 
dispositions, habits, and thoughts of the 
mind, are continually changing. We feel 
and know that we are the same : this notion 
or persuasion of Identity, results from 
memory. But our being actually the same 
does not depend upon memory. If a man 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 119 

loses all recollection of his early life, he 
continues, nevertheless, actually the same 
person. 

Imagination. See Idea. When it is said 
that the mind possesses the faculty of 
imagination, all that is meant is, that, as 
often as we will, we can join together, in 
different ways, the ideas of things which we 
have before seen, heard, or felt. When we 
know that we are forming these images at 
our pleasure, we are said to imagine : when 
they come into the mind along with the 
feeling of having actually perceived them at 
some former time, we are said to remember, 
or to exercise memory. 

Induction, is the observing as many facts as 
we can, or the trying as many experiments as 
we can, in order to discover the real nature 
or causes of things. 

For example: — Suppose a person recovers 
from a fever, after taking some new medi- 
cine, we naturally suppose that this medi- 
cine was the cause of his recovery ; but it is 
not certain that it was so ; because he might 
have recovered as soon, if he had not taken 
it : we must try this medicine in many cases, 



120 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT* 

carefully observing all the effects it produces 
in different patients, before we ought to con- 
clude that it is a remedy for this particular 
kind of fever : and after we have thus proved 
by induction, that it will cure one kind of 
fever, we must not conclude that it will also 
cure a similar kind of fever, till after we 
have tried it in many cases. 

Lord Bacon first taught the true way of 
gaining substantial and useful knowledge by 
Induction, Men have always been fond of 
fancying that they understood the nature of 
things, without taking the pains to observe 
facts and try experiments. See Experi- 
ment. Hypothesis. Inference. 
Inference. An Inference is some proposition 
which is perceived to be true, because of 
its connexion with some known fact. There 
are many things which are always found 
together; or which certainly follow each 
other : therefore, when we observe one of 
these things, we infer that the other also 
exists, or has existed, or will soon take place. 
If we see the print of human feet on the 
sands of an unknown coast, we infer that 
the country is inhabited : if these prints are 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 121 

fresh, and below the level of high water, we 
infer that the inhabitants are at no great 
distance : if the prints are those of naked 
feet, we infer that these inhabitants are 
probably savages : if they are the prints of 
shoes, we infer certainly, that they are, in 
some degree, civilized. 

The confidence with which we rely upon 
the truth of an inference, results from a per- 
suasion natural to the human mind — That 
every effect has a cause ; and — That the 
connexion of certain causes with certain 
effects is constant : or, in other words, — 
That events which we observe uniformly to 
succeed each other, have always succeeded 
each other in the same order ; and that they 
will continue so to do. To refer to the 
instance just mentioned ; when we observe 
the print of human feet upon the sand, how 
do we know that men have lately been upon 
the spot ? Why do we believe a fact which 
we did not see and which no one has re- 
ported to us ? The manner in which the 
conviction takes in the mind is this : — Here 
is a fact before us, namely, impressions upon 
the sand : we think of these impressions as 

G 



122 ELEMENTS OE THOUGHT. 

Effects produced by a Cause : — a change in 
the surface of the sand has taken place, and 
we cannot think of any change taking place 
in the state of things without a cause. The 
nature of the effect then guides us in 
searching for the cause : — a hollow in the 
sand, having the size and shape of the 
human foot, must have been caused by the 
pressure of the human foot. 

But when these prints, though below the 
level of high water, are yet well denned, 
why do we infer that men must be at no 
great distance ? This inference rests upon 
the persuasion that the course of natural 
causes remains constant. These prints, we 
say, have been made within the space of six 
hours, because the interval between high and 
low water is constantly about six hours, and 
because the flowing of the tide would have 
obliterated such slight impressions if they 
had been made before the last flow. If, 
therefore, men have trode upon these sands 
since the last tide, they cannot now be at a 
great distance ; because men do not remove 
from place to place with the swiftness of 
birds. In all this reasoning we rely upon 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 123 

the persuasion that every effect has a cause, 
and that the succession of causes and effects 
is uniform or constant. 

In fact, this sort of reasoning", and this 
reference of the mind to the uniformity of 
causes and effects, does not deliberately take 
place on every common occasion. Many 
inferences are made in the course of every 
day, by an instantaneous action of thought. 
Effects suggest their causes to the mind, 
without a formal process of reasoning". 
Reasoning and a reference to the uniformity 
of causes and effects take place only when 
some doubt arises relative to the true cause 
of an effect. 

Inferences are liable to be erroneous, 
chiefly from two causes : — 

1st. We may too hastily suppose certain 
events to be constantly connected, as cause 
and effect, which really have been only occa- 
sionally or accidentally connected. Many 
superstitious opinions, held by uneducated 
persons, are founded upon false inferences of 
this sort. Some particular domestic acci- 
dent has been observed to occur before the 
death of an individual of the family. The 
g2 



124 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

next time this accident occurs, it is supposed 
to be the prognostic of another death. This 
is a false inference, because there was no 
connexion of cause and effect between the 
accident and the death. 

2dly. Inferences are often false, because 
we fix upon the cause of an effect incon- 
siderately, either not knowing', or not duly 
regarding the many other causes which may 
have been in operation to produce the Effect. 
False inferences of this sort are of very fre- 
quent occurrence in common life. It is the 
part of a sound and calm judgement, to hold 
the mind in suspense, rather than to draw 
hasty inferences where there is reason to sus- 
pect that we are not acquainted with all the 
causes that may have produced the effect 
which we wish to account for : for ex- 
ample; — A person receives a letter pro- 
fessing to contain a bank note ; but the note 
is not in it. The seal has some appearance 
of having been broken and repaired : the 
letter was delivered to him by a servant 
whose integrity he has some reason to 
suspect. The inference which is immediately 
suggested by these facts is that this servant 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 125 

has withdrawn the note from the letter. But 
to make this inference without proof would 
be unjustifiable. A person of sound judge- 
ment will remember that this is a case in 
which many causes beside the one mentioned 
might be supposed to have produced 
the effect. He therefore suspends his 
opinion, till he has made further inquiry. 
In a few days he learns from his corres- 
pondent that after he had sealed the letter, 
he re-opened it to add a postscript, and that, 
in so doing, the note fell out, and was not 
perceived until the letter was dispatched. 

Nothing is more important in the conduct 
of life than the habit of abstaining from 
unwarrantable inferences. A wise man 
suspends his inferences upon the modest 
recollection of his ignorance, and the falli- 
billity of his judgement. On the contrary, 
both weak minds, and ardent minds, — the 
former from fear, the latter from presump- 
tion, fix upon the first inference which the 
nature of an effect may suggest. 

In philosophical inquiries, inferences 
should follow the most complete and satis- 
factory induction; (see Induction;) and 

63 



126 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

where, from the nature of the case, this 
complete and satisfactory induction cannot 
take place, we should ingenuously confess 
our ignorance. (See Truth.) 

The chief source of false systems of 
natural philosophy has been, that probable 
or plausible conjectures have been admitted 
in the place of just inferences: such con- 
jectures, how plausible soever they may 
seem, ought merely to be employed hypo- 
thetically, to suggest and guide Experi- 
ments. 

See Reasoning; Induction; Experi- 
ment; Hypothesis. 
Infinite, — that which has no bounds, or end : 
things, also, are called infinite of which we 
do not know, or do not notice the boundaries ; 
thus, if a line be drawn without regarding 
the length of it, it is called an infinite line ; 
though it may not actually be longer than 
another line beside it, which is called 
finite ; because we mark, measure, or notice 
the boundaries of it. 

It is very common to use the word infinite 
improperly, instead of absolute^ or perfect. 
When we speak of qualities which cannot be 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 127 

numbered or measured, it is more correct to 
call them perfect, or imperfect, than finite, 
or infinite. Snow is not infinitely white ; 
but perfectly white : we may, indeed, use 
the word infinite in relation to the Divine 
Attributes ; because we wish to express in 
a general way, that every thing which 
relates to God is beyond our comprehension : 
thus we say that God is infinitely holy, and 
infinitely good, and wise : though, if we 
designed to speak more accurately, we 
should say that God is perfectly, or abso- 
lutely holy, good, and wise. 
Intellectual, from Intelligo, to understand, 
or know. All the operations of the mind in 
receiving new ideas, or in remembering 
those formerly received ; in joining them 
together, or in separating and comparing 
them, belong to what are usually called 
the intellectual powers. The Intellectual 
powers are commonly distinguished from the 
Moral powers, the objects of which are, 
whatever excites feelings or emotions of 
pleasure, or pain ; things beautiful, or 
Ugly ; — things good, or evil. 



g4 



128 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Intuition, from Intueor, to look upon. What 
we know or comprehend as soon as we 
perceive or attend to it, we are said to know 
by intuition : things which we know by 
intuition, cannot be made more certain by 
arguments, than they are at first. We 
know by intuition that all the parts of a 
thing together, are equal to the whole of it. 
Axioms are propositions known by intuition. 
Invention. There are two very different 
operations of the mind to which the word 
Invention is commonly applied. 

Poetical Invention is the collection, selec- 
tion, and combination of images or senti- 
ments, which are perceived to agree in pro- 
ducing some particular effect upon the ima- 
gination or the feelings. Poetical invention, 
therefore, results from the perception and 
recollection of resemblances or analogies. 

Mechanical Invention results from efforts 
of abstraction. It is founded upon the 
perception of the relation of means to an 
end ; or the knowledge of the connexion 
between causes and effects. Some effect is 
proposed or imagined. The effect suggests 
various causes by which it might be pro- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 129 

duced : the qualities of these causes are 
compared by an effort of abstraction ; and 
that particular cause is adopted, which is 
supposed to be the most fit to produce the 
desired effect. There are two things in 
which, chiefly, the talent of mechanical 
invention consists : the first is the ready and 
copious suggestion of analogous ideas ; 
herein it resembles poetical invention, and 
wit. The second is the habit of considering 
abstractedly the mathematical properties and 
relations of bodies. 

Men and beasts alike betake themselves 
to the shelter of trees or rocks during a 
pelting storm : they both seek to accom- 
plish an end by the use of the means. The 
animal, however, proceeds no further than 
to recollect the connexion between the tree 
or rock, and the feeling of protection from 
cold and wet, which it has before afforded. 
But Man, not only remembers this con- 
nexion, he thinks abstractedly of Shelter or 
protection ; and the abstract notion suggests 
other things which might afford it in a 
better or more certain manner. What then 
does he do ? does he seek to construct some- 
g5 



130 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

thing as similar as possible to the rock or 
the tree which have hitherto afforded him 
shelter ? He would do this if he simply 
followed the suggestions of memory : but 
he aims to realize the abstract notion he 
has formed of Shelter, The rock affords 
shelter only from one quarter : the tree is 
pervious to the wind and rain : but the hut 
which he builds is a shelter on all sides, 
impervious to the weather. The rock, the 
tree, the hut, agree in one abstract pro- 
perty ; they afford shelter ; and the artificial 
product of this abstract notion unites the 
protecting properties of the various objects 
from which the notion was first formed. 

The use of Instruments, distinguishes 
man from inferior animals, and gives him 
power over them, and over many of the 
operations of nature* Now every instru- 
ment, or tool, or weapon, every machine, — 
every production of skill and labour, by 
man supplies his wants, defends himself 
from injuries, or abridges manual labour, is 
the embodying of some complex abstract 
notion. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 131 

Invention is distinguished from Dis- 
covery. Invention is the creation or con- 
struction of some thing which has not before 
existed. Discovery is the making manifest 
some thing which hitherto has been unknown. 
The art of navigation has been improved by 
a signal discovery, namely, the polarity of 
the magnet : and also by a signal invention — 
the time-piece : by the discovery of the 
polarity of the magnet, the direction of the 
ship's course is known : by the invention of 
the chronometer, the ship's place — east or 
west, is determined. 
Judgement. When we perceive or think of 
two objects, we do not merely think of them 
separately; but most often, we compare 
them together, and determine that they are 
like or unlike ; equal or unequal ; &c. 
Judgement is this act of the mind in com- 
paring together two or more objects or 
notions, and in forming some kind of pro- 
position expressive of the relation which has 
been perceived . 

Judgement is often spoken of as a separate 
power or faculty of the soul, in distinction 
from Imagination, Memory, &c. All that 
g6 



132 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

is really meant by these modes of expres- 
sion is, that the mind sometimes compares 
objects or notions ; — sometimes joins together 
images ; sometimes has the feeling of past 
time with an idea now present, &c. When 
it is said that such a one has much Imagin- 
ation, but that he has little Judgement ; 
or of another, that he has an acute Judge- 
ment, but no Imagination ; — it is intended 
to say, that one mind is most apt to perceive 
differences among objects or notions ; while 
another is occupied by resemblances and 
analogies, and attracted by what is beautiful 
and sublime. 

When the particular character of different 
minds is spoken of, there are several epithets 
usually connected with the word Judgement. 
The Judgement is said to be calm, or cool, 
or dispassionate : it is said to be clear* 
or acute, or profound, or comprehensive. 
Most of these epithets express the freedom 
of the intellectual faculty from some one of 
those influences which are apt to disturb the 
mind in the operation of comparing objects 
or notions. It must be remembered that 
the mind never acts without some motive : 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 133 

now the only motive which should influence 
the mind in canyhn on any purely intellec- 
tual operation is—TTie desire to arrive at 
a true result. If x person is employed in 
determining which is the greater number — 
twice four, or three times three, he is incited 
to carry on the necessary process of reason- 
ing, simply by the wish to obtain a true 
solution of the problem: but if it were 
possible to be deceived in resolving such 
a problem ; and if, at the same time, the 
person had some motive for wishing to prove 
that twice four are more than three times 
three, the intellectual process would be in- 
terrupted, or obscured by this wish, and an 
erroneous solution would probably be the 
consequence. There is, however, little 
room for indirect motives in mathematical 
reasoning, but in the conduct of common 
affairs, or in the formation of opinions, 
there are almost always some motives beside 
the desire of truth, which ? more or less, 
strongly influence the Judgement. A good 
Judgement, therefore, is one in which the 
desire of truth is always the predominant 
motive. But there is some diversity in the 



134 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

excellence of the Judgement : or, in other 
words, one mind is most free from one kind 
of improper motive, another, from another 
kind ; for example : — 

A person is said to have a calm Judge- 
ment who is able to carry on the intellectual 
process of comparing objects or notions 
without being intimidated by circumstances 
of danger in which he may be placed, or 
agitated by the passion or violence of those 
about him : he is not disturbed by motives 
of fear or resentment, &c. Such a person 
may be an able General, or a good Arbiter 
in angry disputes. A calm Judgement 
united to benevolence, constitutes the cha- 
racter of the peace-maker. 

The phrase a cool Judgement is commonly 
used nearly in the same sense. The calm- 
ness of the Judgement consists in the power 
of the mind to resist external disturbances. 
The coolness of the Judgment results from 
the absence of internal disturbance. Such 
internal disturbance may proceed from 
nervous irritability,— or from the liveliness 
of the imagination, — or from the sensibility 
of the moral feelings, — or from sensual or 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 135 

malignant passions. Persons who have this 
coolness of Judgement are likely to be suc- 
cessful in trade ; because the desire of gain 
is a tranquil passion ; and it serves to give 
vigour to the desire to obtain a true result 
on every occasion when the Judgement is to 
be exercised. A person of cool Judgement 
will have an advantage over many of those 
with whom he deals ; because, while the 
intellectual action of most men's minds is 
impeded or perverted by a variety of motives, 
his are free from such influence ; and there- 
fore the probability of forming just estimates 
of things will always be in his favour. It 
may be observed, however, that persons 
who have this coolness of Judgement, owing 
to their frequent success in the conduct of 
affairs, are peculiarly liable to self-conceit ; 
this vanity becomes at length an indirect 
motive, which tends to pervert or disturb 
the understanding. Such men, in order to 
obtain the immediate gratification of their 
intellectual vanity, often confine their views 
to the present moment, and to small advan- 
tages, while they become blind to great 
and distant objects. The common terms — 



136 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

c cunning, fraud, worldly -wisdom,' &c* 
express different degrees of that sort of 
short sightedness which is produced by 
self conceit on a cool Judgement. Coolness 
of Judgement is truly admirable when it 
results, not from the want of imagination 
and moral sensibility, but from strength of 
Will, which is able, whenever it is neces- 
sary, to keep all emotions in subjection. 

The epithets acute, profound, and com- 
prehensive, applied to the Judgement, ex- 
press different degrees or kinds of activity 
and of force in the intellect. Next to the 
various perverting motives which have just 
been referred to, the principal source of 
errors in judgement is the inertia, or ten- 
dency to rest, which belongs to mind as well 
as to matter. Intellectual action ceases 
before the process of comparing objects or 
notions is completed ; these unfinished com- 
parisons are, of course, false judgements. 
Now activity or force of mind which opposes 
this inertia, shows itself in different ways ; 
for example : — a mind capable of a short 
and vigorous effort, will complete a single 
process of thought, and produce a perfect 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 137 

comparison of two or three objects. This 
sort of faculty forms what is called an acute 
Judgement. A mind capable of long con- 
tinued, but not very rapid action, will com- 
plete the comparisons it makes, and will 
pursue one pair or set of comparisons after 
another, as long as it can perceive any con- 
nexion between sets of objects or notions. 
This sort of faculty constitutes a profound 
Judgement. 

Where a vivid desire of truth or know- 
ledge is united with great modesty, or diffi- 
dence, or, perhaps, with some feebleness in 
the constitution, there will be an intermitted 
or reiterated action in the mind, in relation 
to the same subject : this will leave the mind 
open to the occurrence of new objects or 
ideas, which ought to be included in the 
comparisons that are carrying on : the 
frequent correction of comparisons or judge- 
ments will induce the habit of suspending 
the judgement, and of viewing every subject 
in different lights. These habits produce a 
comprehensive Judgement. 

Acute minds often err from the want of 
reiterated action : Profound minds often 
err from the want of intermitted action. 



138 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Comprehensiveness is the highest excellence 
of the Judgement. Acuteness, profound- 
ness, or comprehensiveness, are often found 
without calmness, or coolness. In such 
eases the excellence of the judgement is 
liable to be entirely obscured, and only 
appears under favourable circumstances. 
Hence it is, that some persons are able to 
conduct other men's affairs with the most 
admirable judgement, who always mis- 
manage their own : in their own affairs they 
cannot be calm or cool. Hence too, it often 
happens that studious men, whose minds are 
in the highest degree acute, profound, or 
comprehensive, while occupied with literary 
or philosophical subjects, act like children 
when occasionally exposed to the agitations 
of public life. 
Logic, is the art of thinking well. The mind, 
like the body, requires to be trained before 
it can use its powers in the most advan- 
tageous way. A man may be strong and 
brave without having learnt the military 
exercise; but he will be able to exert his 
natural strength and courage to much 
more advantage, after he has been trained 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 139 

as a soldier : and so, a man whose under- 
standing has been regularly taught and 
exercised in the art of Thinking, will be able 
to employ his natural powers more quickly, 
easily, and certainly, than he could otherwise 
have done. 

A multiplicity of unmeaning or unim- 
portant distinctions were formerly made, 
and much idle labour was spent in logical 
studies. The good sense of modern times 
has brought these useless pursuits into 
disesteem ; but this revolution in the plan 
of education has perhaps been carried too 
far : the artificial training and exercise of 
the intellectual powers is, at present, too 
little regarded. A modern education stores 
the memory with a great and various mass 
of well- ascertained and important facts ; 
but it leaves the powers of abstraction and 
reasoning uncultivated, and only accidentally 
exercised. In consequence of this system, 
while extensive information on all those 
branches of knowledge which consist in 
mere collections of facts is widely diffused, 
very few individuals are found who are com- 
petent to a continued effort of thought : and 



140 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

very few books are published which require 
in the reader more than the lightest exercise 
of the intellectual faculties. 

Logic is distinguished from Metaphysics : 
the former is an art, the design of which is 
to exercise the mind in abstraction, general- 
ization, and reasoning; the latter is a 
science, which professes to explain all facts 
relating to the nature of the mind. 

Matter, is that which occupies Space ; and 
with which we become acquainted by its 
obstructing or preventing the movements of 
the body. Every thing of which we have 
any knowledge, js either Mind, or Matter. 
Mind is that which feels : — matter is that 
which makes itself felt by the mind, through 
the sense of touch. 

Memory, is the having an idea or notion along 
with some thought of past time. Memory 
gives us the notion of continued existence, 
or duration ; and also the persuasion of 
personal Identity, during all the changes 
which may take place in the temper, and 
habits, and external circumstances, and the 
condition of the body. Memory gives us 
this persuasion ; but our actually being the 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 141 

same does not depend upon our recollection 
of our past lives, for if we were entirely to 
lose all memory, we should as truly be the 
same persons as before. 
Method, is the putting our thoughts in a 
certain order, for the convenience of our 
own minds, or the minds of those whom 
we wish to teach. Methodical habits of 
thought are often mistaken for Analytical 
habits of Thought. See Chap. IX. and 
Analysis. 
Mind. That which perceives, feels, thinks, 

and wills. 
Mode. The manner in which a thing exists 
is called a mode, or affection : Shape and 
Colour are modes of matter : Memory and 
joy are modes of mind. See Affection. 
Essence. 
Nature. All the properties or qualities which 
make a thing what it is, are signified by 
the word nature, or essence. It is a con- 
venient word by which we express at once 
all that belongs to our notion of any thing. 
Necessity, is opposed to contingency : future 
events, of which we do not know the causes 
that may influence them, are called con- 



142 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tingent ; but events of which we know the 
causes, so that we are able certainly to 
foretel what will happen, are called neces- 
sary. The only difference between what we 
call contingent, and what we call necessary 
exists in our own minds, and depends upon 
different degrees of knowledge. Every 
event has a cause ; and every cause produces 
its effect certainly, in connection with other 
causes. 

The very same event may be considered 
as contingent by one man and as coming 
to pass necessarily by another. A bowing 
wall is observed by two persons : if the 
first is asked whether it will stand a year 
longer, he replies, — ( It may fall, probably ; 
but it is possible that it may stand a year : 
its falling is a contingent event.' The other 
person, who is a builder, has examined the 
state of the wall ; he perceives that it is con- 
stantly declining from the perpendicular : he 
sees that it must fall in a few days : he, 
therefore, considers the event, not as con- 
tingent, but as necessary. The difference 
in the opinion of these two persons results 
from their different degrees of knowledge. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 143 

Whoever knows perfectly all the causes 
which will influence an event, views that 
event, not as contingent, but as necessary. 

Necessity is often opposed to Liberty, 
when the actings of the mind are spoken of. 
A being who has liberty, or, who, as it is 
termed, is a free agent, is one who wills ; 
and who does what he wills. We speak of 
the future actions of men as contingent ; 
because we cannot know the motives or cir- 
cumstances which will be the causes of their 
actions. But we do not so often speak of 
our own future actions as contingent; be- 
cause we commonly suppose ourselves to 
know the motives by which our actions will 
be determined. Yet it is plain that one 
man's actions are not really more contingent 
than those of another. We can imagine our- 
selves to be placed in circumstances, wherein 
we could foretel certainly what our conduct 
would be ; — (supposing no other causes than 
those we are aware of, will be present to 
influence us.) And yet, while we thus think 
of our future conduct as certain, or neces- 
sary, we still feel ourselves perfectly free. 
We are sure that we are free agents, when- 



144 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

ever we can choose, and follow our choice. 
The future actions of men are known to 
God ; because he knows all the causes that 
will influence their actions. 

Negative, is opposed to Positive, if the 
absence of some active quality is spoken of : 
for instance : — harmlessness may be called 
a negative virtue : beneficence is a positive 
virtue. Harmlessness is negative, as it 
implies the absence of a disposition to com- 
mit inquiries : it is also negative, if con- 
trasted with the active disposition to do 
good. 

Negative is opposed to affirmative, when 
the words are applied to propositions. 

c Riches are not sufficient to make a man 
happy.' This is a negative proposition ; 
because two things are brought together, 
and it is declared that they do not agree. 

* True happiness results from the favour 
of God.' This is an affirmative proposi- 
tion : two things are compared which are 
found to agree, or to be connected together. 

Notion. Any thought may be called a notion. 
The word Idea properly means an image in 
the mind of something that has been per- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 145 

ceived by the senses : a notion is also dis- 
tinguished from a feeling, or emotion, in 
which the mind is conscious of pleasure or 
pain. 

Order. Many things considered indefinitely, 
or without regard to how many, constitute 
a multitude : many things considered defi- 
nitely, as so many, make a number. Order 
is the following of one thing after another, 
in a fixed way. In using the word number 
we think of the whole together, — making, — 
20, — 50, &c. But in using the word order 
we think of one among a number ; and of 
the place where it stands in relation to the 
whole number ; as the twentieth, or the 
fiftieth. The word order is used, generally, 
to signify, that many things are placed 
together in a fixed way, to answer some 
end or design : in this sense Method pro- 
duces Order, 

Opinion. Any proposition which we believe, 
but do not absolutely know to be true, is 
called an Opinion. The word is most com- 
monly applied to propositions which are 
believed by some persons, and doubted, or 
disbelieved by others ; and which are, there- 

H 



i 



146 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

fore, often disputed : it is most especially 
applied to questions in which men feel a 
lively interest : we speak of ' religious 
opinions,' and of e political opinions ;' but 
not so usually of scientific opinions ; because 
it is but a few individuals who feel a lively 
interest in scientific disputes. 

The opinions of men, with the exception 
of a few individuals, are, like their manners 
and the fashion of their dress, received from 
education, and influenced by the particular 
society in which they move. It must be 
remembered that in subjects which do not 
admit of demonstration, there is always 
some appearance of truth to support even 
the least probable opinion : and if the mind 
is accustomed to attend only, or chiefly to 
this appearance of reason, on one side, while 
from indolence or prejudice, it never com- 
pletes any process of thought in relation to 
the other side of the question, it may hold 
its opinion without insincerity, and without 
being chargeable with an entire want of 
thought in regard to the disputed point. 
The mind acts, but its action ceases before 
the comparison of notions is perfected. 



*- ^~- 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 147 

That smaller number of persons, who at 
an adult age, change their opinions, or 
whose opinions can, with propriety, be 
called their own, may be arranged under 
four classes. 

The First Class consists of those who 
change their opinions, simply because they 
cannot retain any opinion long : this may 
arise from several causes : — 1st. From a 
sort of feeble activity in the intellectual 
powers : in such minds, there is constant 
movement ; but no exertion : no com 
parisons of notions are actually completed : 
the mind never touches the truth of a pro- 
position. 2d. From levity or frivolity of 
temper, and a childish love of novelty. 
3d. From that vanity which is gratified by 
the show of liberality and freedom from 
prejudice. 4th. From melancholic timidity 
which creates a distrust of all evidence : 
such persons change their opinions merely 
from the fear of having been deceived in 
those which they last held. 

The Second Class consists of those who 
adopt opinions which gratify some strong 
peculiarity in their tempers. For example : — 
H 2 



148 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

The strenuous advocates of particular poli- 
tical opinions, very rarely are such from 
calm conviction, or from a philosophical 
study of human nature, and an extensive 
acquaintance with history ; but from some 
very evident asperity, or malignity, or arro- 
gance in their tempers. He whose temper 
is, at once, timid and arrogant, will, pro- 
bably, adopt opinions favourable to arbitrary 
government : he will have little sympathy 
for the privations, or regard to the rights of 
the many ; while he will approve of the 
force, and justify the corruption by which 
the exclusive privileges of the few are 
maintained. On the other hand, he whose 
pride is more courageous, and more mali- 
cious, will adopt opinions which give the 
best colour to an acrid, turbulent, and 
malignant animosity towards the particular 
persons who may administer the Govern- 
ment. 

Under this head may be included (though 
they might well form a class by themselves) 
those persons in whom what is commonly 
called the spirit of contradiction, or the love 
of controversy and contention, is the ruling 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



149 



motive. Such persons may be driven into 
the profession of any opinion by opposition. 
To secure themselves from the danger of 
meeting with individuals who may think en- 
tirely as they do, they often adopt and profess 
some odd notion, or system of notions, so 
absurd as to be quite beyond the reach of 
reason and argument. 

The Third Class consists of those who 
adopt or change their opinions in conse- 
quence of rational conviction, produced by 
inquiry and reflection. 

This intelligent formation or change of 
opinions is not rare on literary and scientific 
questions ; because on these subjects there is 
little room for motives of interest, or of party 
spirit ; and because it is chiefly persons of a 
calm and intellectual character, who addict 
themselves to pursuits of this sort. A man 
who, from ostentation or perversity of 
temper, may choose to maintain some ex- 
travagant scientific system, is, at the present 
day, rarely able to make a party large enough 
to give permanent support to his absurdities : 
he is therefore presently abandoned to ridi- 
cule ; and forgotten. 
h3 



150 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

A purely rational change of political or 
religious opinions may take place after 
inquiry and reflection, either from peculiar 
calmness and ingenuousness of temper ; or 
from the force and superiority of the under- 
standing : in minds of a high order the 
pleasure of knowledge, or, the love of 
truth, furnishes a motive which is always 
stronger than any other. 

The Fourth Class consists of those who 
form or change their opinions (chiefly re- 
ligious opinions,) in consequence of a change 
in thpir moral dispositions- 

For example; — When young persons who 
have been religiously educated become de- 
praved in their moral feelings, and licentious 
in their conduct, the vitiation of the imagi- 
nation and the social affections tends to 
obscure that internal evidence of the truth 
of Christianity, which, to a mind not de- 
praved or perverted, is alone sufficient to 
command belief. And as the injunctions 
and the awful sanctions of the Bible are the 
principal restraints upon the passions, there 
is a strong motive for wishing to invalidate 
its authority : this motive may so far divert 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 151 

the attention from the direct evidence of* 
Revelation, and so fix it upon objections 
and difficulties, that, at length, a very 
sincere kind of infidelity may be produced, 
which may continue to infatuate the under- 
standing to the last moment of life. 

A happier change of opinions takes place 
when the mind, from a state of moral and 
religious indifference, or insensibility, or 
depravation, becomes alive to its account- 
ability to God, and to the vast interests of 
the future life. A change of this sort will 
ijot fail to be accompanied by a diligent 
perusal of the Scriptures, with that earnest 
and humble prayer for the promised guidance 
of the Holy Spirit which is the first and 
principal sign of religious sincerity. In this 
state of mind the plain sense of Scripture, 
on those few points in which a right belief is 
indispensible to true virtue, will be admitted 
without refinements or perversions. If the 
same nominal opinions have previously been 
held, they will now become the objects of a 
moral, as well as of a merely rational assent : 
or if different opinions have before been 
entertained, they will, as it were, wither, 
h4 



152 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

and fall away from the mind, or be instan- 
taneously cast off, as having no congruity 
with the new state of the feelings. 

See Judgement. Prejudice. 
Passion, is opposed to Action, A passive 
state is the state of a thing while it is 
operated upon by some cause : a thing is 
passive in which some effect is produced : 
the word Passion has been applied to the 
strong feelings of the mind; because in 
such a state, the mind is influenced by some 
object which is the cause of the feeling : the 
passion of fear is the feeling caused in the 
mind by some object which is supposed 
likely to injure us. 

The mind even while under the most vio- 
lent agitation, whether from emotions of 
resentment or desire, is still in a passive, 
not in an active state : it is moved by ex- 
ternal objects, or by animal sensations ; 
and the more movement there is, the less 
ability is there in the mind to resume its 
active state. It was the constant aim of the 
ancient ethical philosophy to render the mind 
less liable to passive movements by culti- 
vating the habit of intellectual activity. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 153 

But, with the exception of a few individuals, 
whose constitutions maybe peculiarly sedate, 
and whose tastes are at the same time wholly 
intellectual, this plan has always been found 
utterly inefficient. The aim of the Christian 
Religion is, neither to render the mind in- 
sensible to natural emotions, nor to quell 
emotion by simple reasoning ; but to oppose 
motive to motive, by gradually withdrawing 
the mind from the sphere of those which are 
sensual and malignant, and inducing the 
habitual operation of those which are pure, 
elevated, and benevolent. These calmer 
motives are always compatible with the 
active state of the mind : they do not shake 
or disturb its perfect command of itself : 
the emotions which spring from them are 
rational, but the agitation of the sensual 
or malignant passions produces a sort of 
temporary insanity. 
Perception, is distinguished from sensation. 
The mere feeling in the organs of sense, 
occasioned by an external object, is called 
sensation : when this feeling gives the mind 
the notion of some external object, which is 
the cause of the sensation, we are said to 
h5 



154 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

perceive ; or to have perception. If we 
had but one sense ; the sense of smell, 
for instance, we should never imagine that 
there was any external cause which produced 
the sensation ; but it is by comparing what 
we see, with what we touch, or hear, or 
smell, or taste, that we learn to think of the 
causes of our sensations : and thus have 
perceptions of things without us. 

Phenomenon, from Qouvopem — something which 
makes its appearance. The word is most 
properly applied to some fact in the course 
of nature, which has either not been before 
observed ; or which is not yet perfectly 
understood. 

Positive. See Negative. 

Power. It has already been said (see Cause,) 
that the notion of Power is a simple Abstrac- 
tion, derived from our consciousness when, 
by an act of the Will, we produce a change, 
either in the mind itself, or in the position 
of the body, by the action of the muscles. 
The mind naturally and involuntarily con- 
nects this notion of Power with whatever 
seems to produce an Effect. Hence it is 
common to say, that every Cause has in 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 155 

it the power to produce its proper Effect. 
We speak of the Powers of Nature, 
generally; or, in particular instances, of 
the Power of the Sun to produce the 
evaporation of fluids, and the ripening of 
fruits ; — of the elastic Power of the Atmos- 
phere ; — the expansive Power of Steam, &c. 
This mode of speaking ought to be under- 
stood simply as expressing the antecedence 
of one event, and the uniform sequence of 
another event ;— the first called a Cause, 
the second an Effect. Our inquires into the 
laws of Nature, carry us no further than to 
ascertain what events are uniformly conse- 
quent, the one to the other. We know of 
no Power but that which belongs to the 
Mind. It is an old definition of Mind and 
Matter, agreeable to this explanation of 
Power, — Mind is that which moves ; Matter 
is that which is moved. 
Prejudice. An opinion received or maintained 
without proper regard to the arguments 
which may prove it true, is a Prejudice ; 
whether the opinion be true or false. In 
most cases, Prejudices are opinions which, 
on some account, men are pleased with, 
h6 



156 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

independently of any conviction of their 
truth ; and which, therefore, they are afraid 
to examine, lest they should find them to be 
false. 

A Prejudice is an unreasonable judge- 
ment, formed or held under the influence of 
some other motive than the love of truth. 
Prejudices therefore, may be classed ac- 
cording, to the nature of the motives from 
which they result. These motives are either 
pleasurable, innocent, and social ; or they 
are malignant. 

Among the Prejudices of the First Class 
are to be enumerated — 1st. The false judge- 
ments which result from personal vanity. 
When our own endowments, or qualifi- 
cations, or external advantages, or per- 
formances, are placed in comparison with 
those of others, the pleasurable sensation 
of self-love, either entirely prevents the 
process of comparison, or so disturbs and 
perverts it, that we often acquiesce, without 
suspicion, in the most egregious mistakes. 
2d. Those false judgements which result 
from the social affections. The fondness of 
parents towards their children, and what is 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 157 

usually called the love of Country, generally 
include some prejudices of this kind. There 
is a third species of pleasurable prejudices 
which are more indefinite, though they might 
perhaps, all be traced to some modification 
of self-love ; such are those by which capri- 
cious minds are fixed, for a while, upon some 
object of an accidental preference, with 
a blind and exclusive satisfaction: more 
tenacious tempers are often permanently 
infatuated in their attachment to an object 
which has once been connected with a 
pleasurable sensation. Prejudices of this 
kind often govern the minds, and command 
all the energies of unoccupied persons in 
the prosecution of some frivolous pursuit or 
study. The eager collectors of worthless 
rarities and relics, — and indeed most of 
those who are ardent in the pursuit of the 
minor branches of science or literature, are 
commonly so wrapped up in agreeable pre- 
judices, that they are incapable of forming 
an estimate of the relative importance of the 
objects which engross their attention. The 
human mind is perhaps liable to no preju- 
dices more inveterate and more infatuating, 



158 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

than those, which, in ardent but contracted 
minds, confer a grave and vast importance 
upon the acquisition of shells, or feathers, 
or coins, or antique pot-sherds, or scarce 
editions of worthless books. 

Prejudices of this third kind may be in- 
nocent, those of the second kind are amiable 
and beneficial : those of the first kind are 
always disadvantageous. It is the aim of 
an enlarged and cultivated mind to. found 
right feelings upon true judgements. 

Prejudices of the Second Class, re- 
sulting from malignant feelings, are always 
injurious, as they are always odious. Such 
are those produced by the Pride of rank 
or of intellect ; by capricious antipathies 
against individuals, — by personal animo- 
sities, in consequence of real, or supposed 
injuries ; — by party spirit in matters of 
religion, or politics ; by national, or pro- 
vincial, or municipal jealousies ; — by cor- 
porate interests, as those of station, rank, 
and profession, &c. 

Candour is the willingness to form a true 
judgement in some instance where we are 
conscious of a malignant motive for forming 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 159 

or holding a false judgement. He who has 
no need to exercise candour, has a better 
chance of forming a correct opinion than 
even the most candid temper. False candour 
is a willingness to relinquish a malignant 
prejudice from indolence, indifference, or, 
perhaps, from some stronger opposing 
prejudice. 

Beside these two principal classes there 
are many prejudices which flow from some 
mistaken maxim, or habit of thought ; or an 
unfounded deference to established opinions : 
but such false judgements, when they chiefly 
regard the reasoning faculty, are, for the sake 
of distinction, better called simply errors, 
than prejudices. 
See Opinion. 

Principle, from JPrincipium ; a beginning. 
That from which many other things arise, 
or proceed : the first or most important 
parts or properties of a thing are called its 
Principles. The Principles of a science, 
are those few propositions which are most 
evident, most simple, and most important. 

Primary, is opposed to Secondary. Those 
qualities, or properties, without which we 



160 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

cannot even imagine a thing to exist, are 
called primary qualities. Extension and 
Solidity are called primary qualities of 
matter. Colour, Smell, Taste, — are called 
secondary qualities of matter. This dis- 
tinction is a mere notion of the mind, re- 
sulting from our imperfect knowledge of 
things. 
Probability. This word, often joined with 
some qualifying term, expresses the degree 
of our ignorance in relation to some past 
fact, or future event. It does not relate to 
the fact or event itself, as being more or 
less certain. 

6 It is probable that Babylon was founded 
on the site of the Tower of Babel.' 

6 It is probable that Plato had perused 
some parts of the Jewish Scriptures.' 

' There is some probability in the sup- 
position that the Egyptian Pyramids were 
built by the Israelites, during their bondage.' 

' It is highly probable that the planets 
are inhabited.' 

f It is highly probable that a spark falling 
upon gunpowder will cause its combustion.' 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 161 

' It is probable that the Eastern and 
Western States of North America, will, at 
some future time, form separate Govern- 
ments.' 

c It is probable that a communication 
may, one day, be made between the Medi- 
terranean Sea and the Red Sea, through the 
Isthmus of Suez.' 

• 4 It is probable that a person in health 
will live a year.' 

All these propositions are as certainly 
true, or as certainly false, as that twice 
two are four : or, that three times two are 
seven. We are obliged to speak of them as 
probable on account of our ignorance : and 
we speak of them as more or less probable 
in proportion to our ignorance. 

See Contingent. Necessity. 
Proposition. Any judgement of the mind 
concerning two or more things, expressed 
in words, and declaring that they agree, or 
disagree ; that they are alike, or unlike ; 
that one belongs to the other, or that it does 
not belong to it ; is called a Proposition. 
The thing of which we principally think in 
making a proposition, is called the Subject : 



162 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

what we affirm or deny concerning it, is 
called the Predicate, or the Attribute : the 
predicate means that which is declared ; the 
attribute, that which is rendered or given to 
a thing : for example : — 

'The Earth is round.' 

In this proposition the Earth, is the 
subject : round, is the predicate. 

Propositions which the mind can at once 
comprehend, so as to perceive that they are 
true, are called axioms : as, — c two and two 
are four.' Propositions which are not 
evident at once, require to be proved by 
reasoning : the proposition that the Earth 
is round, is not evident at once ; on the 
contrary, without reflection, we might sup- 
pose it flat. But after we have made several 
unquestionable inferences from known facts, 
we prove, certainly that it is round. 

Propositions are commonly arranged un- 
der several heads, — as, for example ; — 

Some are Affirmative ; — as, ' Temperance 
conduces to health.' 

Some Negative ; as ' Temperance does 
not ensure health' : or they may be divided 
into those which are Universal ; as, — ( All 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 103 

men must die:' — and those which are Parti- 
cular ; as, — ' Some men reach the age of 
an hundred years.' 

These artificial distinctions are of little 
utility or importance. 

Every perfect sentence contains one, or 
more propositions. 

Every verb, with its nominative case, is 
a proposition, or affirmation: — as, — I am; 
he runs. The infinitive mood is the mere 
name of the action, expressed abstractedly ; 
and therefore it contains no affirmation or 
proposition. 
Reason. All the operations of the mind when 
it thinks of the qualities of things separately 
from the things to which they belong ; — or 
when it forms general notions, and employs 
general terms ; or when it judges of the 
agreement or disagreement of different 
things ; — or when it draws inferences ; — 
are comprehended under the term Meason, 
Reason seems chiefly to consist in the 
power to keep such or such thoughts in the 
mind ; and to change them at pleasure ; 
instead of their flowing through the mind 
as in dreams ; also in the power to see the 



164 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

difference between one thought and another, 
and so to compare, separate, or join them 
together afresh. Though animals seem to 
have some little power to perform these 
operations, Man has so much more of it, 
that he, alone, is said to be endowed with 
Reason. 
Reasoning. What is called a chain of rea- 
soning, is the slow process carried on by the 
help of words or other signs which our 
narrow and feeble minds are obliged to pass 
through, before we can perceive the con- 
nexion between two things which are said to 
agree, or to disagree, in some way. Com- 
prehensive and vigorous minds have need of 
less of what is called reasoning, than un- 
cultivated and feeble minds. Much know- 
ledge, with great force and activity in the 
mind, supercedes the necessity of trains 
of reasoning. When it is said that three 
times three are nine, every adult, by an 
instantaneous act of the mind, perceives the 
truth of the proposition ; but a child, com- 
mencing the study of arithmetic, does not 
perceive that three threes are as many 
as nine : it is, therefore, necessary to show 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 165 

him that they are so, by making hiin count 
three parcels of three counters. It is not 
without some such process of reasoning, 
that his feeble and unexercised mind can 
comprehend the connexion affirmed in this 
proposition. 

The nature of the case is precisely the 
same, when an adult is told that the 
figures 4- bear the same proportion to each 
other as the figures ~ ; or that these are two 
forms of expressing the same fraction : 
unless he be expert in calculation, he will 
not instantaneously perceive the truth of 
this proposition ; and it will be necessary 
for him to attend to the arithmetical rea- 
soning by which it is proved to be true. 
If he had more readiness and greater com- 
prehension of mind, he would know this 
proposition, as he knows that twice two are 
four. See Belief, and Demonstration. 

That operation of the mind by which pro- 
positions are proved to be certainly true is 
called Demonstrative Reasoning. 

The operation of the mind is the same in 
reasoning upon subjects that do not admit of 
absolute demonstration. In order to com- 



166 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

prehend the connexion between two facts 
which are affirmed to depend one upon the 
other, it is necessary to attend to all the par- 
ticulars, — one by one, which lie between the 
two facts : as, for example ; — 

If it is affirmed that the cutting a canal 
will facilitate communication between the 
towns near which it passes, the connexion 
between the two facts is easily perceived, 
and no reasoning is necessary to prove the 
truth of the proposition. 

But if it is said that the cutting of this 
canal will occasion the loss of many vessels 
on a part of the coast which is three hundred 
miles distant, we do not at once see the con- 
nection between the two facts here affirmed 
to depend, one upon the other : the con- 
nection must be shown in some such way as 
the following. 

1. Hitherto the copper works at A, have 
been supplied with coal from a distant mari- 
time county. 

2. This new canal will afford a safer and 
cheaper conveyance for coal from the pits 
atD. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 167 

3. A hundred sail of vessels will therefore 
cease to be employed. 

4. But these vessels have given employ- 
ment to a great number of pilots, in a 
dangerous channel, through which they had 
to pass. 

o. These pilots, losing the principal part 
of their employment, will gradually abandon 
the station ; and seek their livelihood else- 
where : the few who remain will be the aged 
or unskilful. 

6. Hence will follow what was at first 
affirmed, — that if the canal be cut, vessels 
which pass through this channel will often 
be exposed to shipwreck, from the want 
of a sufficient number of able and skilful 
pilots. 

After all these circumstances have been 
mentioned, in regular succession, and the 
connection between them perceived, we are 
convinced that the proposition first stated is, 
at least, probably true. 

Every train of Reasoning is an operation 
similar to what is exhibited in this instance. 

See Inference. 



168 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Reasoning is false when some of the par- 
ticular facts are not truly represented, or, 
are not really connected in the way that is 
affirmed ; — Or when some facts which are 
really connected with what is affirmed have 
been omitted. 
Relation. Any sort of connexion which is 
perceived or imagined, between two or 
more things ; or any comparison which is 
made by the mind, is called a Relation. 
When we look at these two lines, 



we do not merely think of them separately, — 
as, this straight line, and that straight line ; 
but they are immediately connected together 
in the mind by a comparison which takes place 
as soon as they meet the eye. We first think 
of them as being alike ; because they are 
both straight ; and we call the notion that is 
formed — the relation of sameness. We then 
think of them as the same in length ; — this 
is the relation of equality. We think of 
them, again, as equally distant from each 
other, from end to end ; and then we say 
they are parallel lines : this word parallel 
represents nothing in the lines themselves ; 
but only the notion formed by measuring the 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 169 

distance between them. All these notions 
spring up in the mind from the comparison 
of the two objects : they belong entirely to 
the mind, and do not exist in the things 
themselves. 

A great number of our notions are formed 
by perceiving the Relation between two or 
more things or ideas. The notion of Truth 
is formed by perceiving the relation between 
an affirmation, and the thing spoken of; 
or between a notion and the thing to which 
it belongs : Truth, then, is a relation of 
sameness or agreement. Sin is a relation 
of disagreement, between an action and a 
rule, or law. Notions so formed are com- 
plex : they require, therefore, to be analysed, 
before we can think or reason correctly con- 
cerning them. See Chap. X. 
Sensation. The mere effect that is produced 
in the mind when some external object acts 
upon the nerves of the eye, the ear, the 
nose, the palate, or the skin or muscles, is 
called Sensation. (See Perception.) All 
our knowledge of external things arises 
from the comparisons which we make be- 
tween sensations of different kinds : we 



170 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

compare the sensations of sight, with those 
of touch ; and so become acquainted with 
the distances and shapes of bodies. 
Signs. Any sound, mark, figure, or image, 
which has been connected with some idea, 
and is employed to recall it to the mind, is 
called a Sign* 

There are two kinds of signs ; Those 
which are Arbitrary, and those which are 
Natural and Representative. 

Arbitrary signs, are certain sounds or 
marks which become joined to particular 
ideas in the minds of men, merely by use, 
and common consent : words spoken and 
written are arbitrary signs : they are called 
arbitrary, because there is no reason why 
such or such sounds or marks should sig- 
nify such or such ideas, except the will 
and agreement of those who use them ; 
hence it has happened that men in diiferent 
a^es and countries have fixed upon very dif- 
ferent sounds and marks to signify the same 
thing. Five men may look at the same 
object : one, when he sees it, will utter the 
sound omot ; another, damns ; another, casa ; 
another, maison ; another, house. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 171 

Sounds are the signs of ideas; and 
marks, or letters, are the signs of sounds. 
There are some few words in all languages 
which are not entirely arbitrary ; hut are in 
some degree natural or representative ; such, 
for instance, as the words which signify the 
voices of animals ; and also some inter- 
jections, expressive of joy and pain. These 
words being similar in all languages, may be 
considered as the natural signs of such 
emotions. All other words are arbitrary 
signs. 

Natural and Representative signs are 
gestures of the body, or expressions of the 
countenance, or such figures or images as 
have some kind of likeness to, or natural 
connexion with, the things they signify. 

Gestures of the body are employed by 
men who do not understand each other's 
language. A great part of the thoughts 
that are excited in the mind in familiar 
conversation is communicated by the various 
expressions of the countenance ; and, such 
expressions being nearly the same in all 
human beings, they may be considered as 
natural signs of ideas 
i 2 



172 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



Symbols are rude pictures, or images of 
objects, from which it is intended that in- 
ferences should be drawn, in order to dis- 
cover the meaning of them. Pictures are 
addressed to the eye ; and are intended to be 
understood at a first glance ; but symbols 
are addressed to the understanding \ A 
Wheat sheaf may be employed as a symbol 
of plenty ; a sword, of war ; scales, of 
justice ; a plough, of industry ; an anchor, 
of security ; an eye, of knowledge ; a heart, 
of affection, %c. All that is necessary in 
symbols, is, that each figure should so 
nearly resemble the things represented, that 
it may be known what object is meant ; and 
also that they should be so put together, that 
it may be possible to discover what is in- 
tended to be understood by the whole. A 
Symbol, more carefully represented, and 
intended to communicate some moral truth, 
is called an Emblem. 

The ancient Egyptians employed symbols 
to represent the principles of their religion ; 
or, perhaps, to record the histories of events, 
or persons : these were called by the Greeks, 
Hieroglyphicks, from ispo$ — sacred, and 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 173 

yxu^co — to carve ; because they were symbols, 
relating to religion, carved upon obelisks. 
Sophism, from <ro<f>io"jxa — a false argument. 
The word is not usually applied to mere 
errors in reasoning ; but to those errors in 
reasoning of which the persons who main- 
tain them are, in some degree, conscious ; 
and which they endeavour to conceal from 
examination by subtilty, and by some am- 
biguity, or other unfairness in the use of 
words. 

In books of Logic are to be found artifi- 
cial classifications of the various kinds of 
Sophisms, with rules for detecting the fal- 
lacies on which they rest. But it requires 
much attention, and some acuteness, as well 
as frequent exercise in disputation, to be able 
to make a ready or immediate use of these 
abstract rules and distinctions. There are, 
however, two or three plain considerations 
and directions which may tend to secure the 
mind from the danger of having important 
principles shaken or overthrown by sophis- 
tical reasonings. 

I. There are some characteristics of so- 
phistical reasoning, by observing which it 
i3 



174 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

may often be suspected, and its influence 
destroyed, when we are not able to detect 
and expose the fallacy. 

1st. Sophistical reasoning is commonly 
subtile in its style ; and the force of the argu- 
ment is made to depend upon niceties and 
refinements in the use of words. A sophis- 
tical reasoner will rarely consent to state his 
argument in any other than the precise terms 
which he has artfully selected. On the con- 
trary, Truth, as it is independent of words, 
may, generally, be stated, with nearly equal 
advantage, in several forms of expression. 
He who defends what he understands, and 
what he honestly believes, is generally less 
solicitous about particular phrases, than he 
who is conscious of reasoning sophistically. 

2d. When sophistical reasoning is not 
crafty and circuitous, it is often abrupt and 
offensive : there is an attempt to force assent 
by some seeming demonstration, which will 
leave no room for reply ; and this, even in 
subjects plainly beyond the reach of demon- 
stration. Now, it should constantly be 
borne in mind, when questions are discussed 
which have long been debated in the world, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 175 

that, if these pretended demonstrations 
were as sound and good as, to those who 
hear them for the first time, they may seem 
to be, they would, long ago, have settled 
the controversy in question. Demonstrative 
reasoning either supersedes all controversy ; 
or it is utterly useless : — it is good for every 
thing ; or it is good for nothing. Truth 
leads the mind : Sophistry drives it. 

3d. Sophistical reasoning is very com- 
monly advanced in the smart, flippant style 
of a repartee, or an epigram. Indeed, it 
will be generally found that those who are 
habitually sophistical reasoners, are, in their 
natural tempers, either crafty, disingenuous, 
and cold ; or self-complacent, flashy, and 
ironical. Dogmatism must not be reckoned 
among the symptoms of sophistry ; because 
it very often results from the full and serious 
conviction of truth in a strong understand- 
ing, joined to an arrogant or irritable temper. 

II. We should never estirctate the sound- 
ness of principles by our own ability to 
defend them ; or consider an objection as 
unanswerable, to which we can find no 
reply. It is an absurd self-confidence, es- 
i4 



176 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

pecially in a young" person, to abandon his 
principles as soon as he may find himself 
worsted in argument. There is no defence 
against flippant sophistry so effectual as an 
intelligent modesty. Indeed, genuine firm- 
ness of mind consists greatly in an habitual 
recollection of our own moderate powers and 
acquirements. Let us suppose the case 
of a person who has a common knowledge 
of astronomy : he has learned that the great 
law of planetary motion is, that the squares 
of the periodical times of the Planets, are 
as the cubes of their distances from the 
centres of their orbits. He understands 
this doctrine, and the manner in which it 
is proved in a general way, and he knows 
that is the received opinion among men of 
science. Now he happens to meet with a 
sophist, whose mathematical acquirements, 
and whose readiness in calculation are 
considerably greater than his own. This 
sophist undertakes to prove that the estab- 
lished doctrine is unfounded ; and he pre- 
tends, by some short and unanswerable 
process, to detect a capital error in the 
calculations by which it is usually proved. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 177 

What then does this person do? — does he 
say — ' Yes, I see we have all been mistaken ; 
your reasoning is unanswerable ; I there- 
fore candidly confess my former error ?' — 
,No one who has a common measure of good 
sense would act thus in the case supposed. 
If he found a difficulty in reconciling the 
sophist's apparent demonstrations with es- 
tablished principles, he would put that diffi- 
culty wholly to the account of his own 
ignorance and incompetency ; and would 
refer it to those who may be able to explain 
to him the fallacy by which he has been 
embarrassed. The same conduct, influenced 
by the same modesty, would, in most cases, 
be the best, as it is in fact the most reason- 
able manner of treating crafty or sarcastic 
sophistry. 

III. Sophistical reasoning is very com- 
monly founded upon an ambiguous use of 
those words which signify complex abstract 
notions ; such, for example, as some of those 
mentioned page 56. The highly important 
habit, therefore, of regarding things and 
notions apart from words, and of analysing 
all complex abstract notions, affords the 
i5 



178 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

best intellectual security against the im- 
pression of fallacious reasoning. When a 
sophistical argument is proposed to a person 
accustomed to think abstractedly and ana- 
lytically, he will, in the first place, examine 
each principal term employed, and, in so 
doing, he will rarely fail to discover that one 
of them is used in two senses, or in a sense 
altogether improper, or inapplicable to the 
subject. 

Sophisms may consist in proving some 
thing which is beside the question ; or in 
artfully changing the real point in dispute. 
Thus, if it be affirmed that the tendency 
of Christianity is much more favourable to 
public and private virtue, than that of any 
other religious system, or than Atheism ; an 
opponent may change the point in dispute, 
by proving that many professors of Christi- 
anity have been worthless and licentious men ; 
or by proving that some Idolaters and some 
Atheists have been blameless in their exter- 
nal conduct. The real points to be deter- 
mined are these : — whether Nations, taken 
at large, in which Christianity has prevailed, 
or in which the Bible has been actually read 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 179 

and regarded by the mass of the people, 
have not greatly surpassed in morality those 
Nations to whom it has been wholly un- 
known, or by whom it has been little re- 
garded : And then, — whether, if any number 
of the most apparently sincere Christians is 
compared with an equal number of the best 
heathens or deists, they will not be found to 
possess a sort of virtue much more complete, 
more pure, and more beneficent. 

Many Sophisms consist in taking for 
granted the very point to be proved. Thus, 
if it be argued that a man who is just and 
temperate need not concern himself with 
matters of faith, or forms of religion, because 
a just and temperate man is virtuous, and 
therefore must always be the object of the 
Divine favour. The thing to be proved, — 
namely, whether justice and temperance, 
without piety, constitute that virtue which 
will be approved by God, is taken for 
granted, by calling the merely just and 
temperate man, virtuous. 

Sophisms are sometimes framed by as- 
signing a wrong cause to some effect. 
There is a sophism of this kind when it is 
16 



180 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

said that Christianity has caused many 
bloody wars, cruel persecutions, and bar- 
barous massacres. While in fact, it has been 
the ferocious passions of men, made more 
ferocious by the rebuke they have received 
from the pure and peaceful spirit of Christi- 
anity, which have been the real causes of 
these wars and persecutions. 

Sophisms often arise from drawing in- 
ferences on insufficient grounds : (See In- 
duction. Inference); or when some effect 
is supposed to be constant, which is only 
accidental : or when some law of nature, or 
rule is stated to be universally true, which, 
in fact, is liable to many exceptions. Per- 
sons who guide their conduct by maxims 
are very liable to deceive themselves by 
sophisms of this sort. There is, perhaps, 
some general truth contained in their 
favourite sayings : but when such maxims 
are made the rules of conduct, they require 
a careful observation of the particular cir- 
cumstances to which they are applied. A 
large proportion of the pointed proverbs 
which tickle the ears of the vulgar, are mere 
sophisms of this class. It may be observed 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 181 

that wide and various information is apt to 
render cultivated minds over cautious in 
calculating upon the exceptions to general 
laws ; while uncultivated minds, almost 
always, make a rude and blind use of 
general rules, without regard to exceptions. 
Whatever may be the nature of a sophism 
it is always disguised by some indistinctness, 
ambiguity, or impropriety in one or more 
of the words by which it is expressed. A 
general rule therefore for detecting the fallacy 
of sophistical reasoning is, to oblige those 
who advance it to define every principal 
word employed, to analyse every complex 
abstract notion, and to use words constantly 
in the same sense. 

See Judgement. Reasoning. 
Space. We obtain the notion of Extension 
by comparing what is seen, with what is felt : 
after we have gained this notion, we are 
able, in thought, to take from it what we 
learn by touch,— -or the notion of some thing 
which resists our movements. Space, then, 
is the word we employ to signify the notion 
of Extension, after we have taken from it 
the notion of Solidity. The way in which 



182 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

this notion is acquired may thus be described, 
but as it is a simple abstract notion, it cannot 
be analysed. 

Species, and Genus. See Ghap. V. 

Subject; that concerning which something is 
affirmed ; or that to which some quality 
belongs. See Proposition. Essence. 
Adjunct. 

Substance. It is natural to us to imagine 
that there is some thing to which all the 
qualities of things belong ; therefore we 
speak of solidity, and extension, and shape, 
and colour, as the qualities of a something, 
— we know not what, which we call matter ; 
and then we say that matter is an extended 
and solid Substance. The mind is called 
a thinking Substance. Whatever there may 
be in things, we know nothing further than 
what we perceive of their various sensible 
qualities. The word Substance, if used in 
distinction from all the qualities of things, 
only expresses our supposition of somewhat 
of which we know nothing. See Affection. 
Succession. The consciousness of one 
thought following another perpetually, gives 
us the notion of duration. The estimate 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 183 

which we form of the length of any portion 
of time depends, partly, upon the number 
of thoughts which has passed through the 
mind ; and partly, upon the liveliness with 
which we remember them : a long day is one 
in which a multitude of agreeable thoughts 
has passed through the mind. A year seems 
longer in youth than in more advanced life ; 
. because, in youth, the attention is less 
fixed upon single objects ; and the course 
of the thoughts is more rapid, and more 
often diverted into new directions. See 
Duration. 
Suggestion. Our minds are so formed, that 
thoughts which have once been brought to- 
gether, are afterwards apt to return to the 
mind together. The course of the thoughts, 
when they are left to flow on without any 
direction from the Will, seems to be governed 
by the connexions which have been ac- 
cidentally formed among them. If we 
attempt to trace back the wanderings of 
our thoughts, we shall generally be able 
to discover some connexion between ideas, 
which has led the mind, in the course of a 
few minutes, to be occupied with the most 



184 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

widely different things. Often it is merely 
some likeness in the sound of words which 
ties thoughts together : often it is some 
similarity in the feeling of pleasure, or 
displeasure, towards two different objects : 
often, the sight of an object will bring into 
the mind the thoughts which happened to 
engage us when we last saw it. 

Even when we endeavour to direct our 
thoughts by an act of the Will, we still, more 
or less, follow the natural or the accidental 
connexions which have been formed among 
them ; and the difference observable in men's 
way of thinking, when they direct their 
minds to the same objects, depends, greatly, 
upon what it is which usually suggests their 
thoughts. One man's thoughts are sug- 
gested, chiefly, by words, and forms of 
expression, which have been stored in the 
memory : such a person will think rapidly, 
and speak fluently, and with much pro- 
priety ; but he will not often bring forward 
what is new. Another man's thoughts are 
suggested, chiefly, by the feelings he is 
most subject to, — such as benevolence, or 
anger, or contempt, or the love of freedom, 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 185 

or the sense of religion. Such a man will 
bring forward thoughts that are so proper to 
the occasion on which he writes, or speaks, 
that he will easily lead other men into the 
same feelings ; but he will not be able to 
think well, except when his feelings are 
excited. 

Another man's thoughts are chiefly sug- 
gested by the real resemblances or analogies 
or differences of things ; without regard to 
words, or other men's opinions. Such a man 
will think philosophically. To have the 
thoughts thus suggested by the real nature 
of things, and not by words ; or by the 
moral feelings; or by the pleasures of the 
fancy, constitutes what is called the philoso- 
phical spirit. It is often not difficult to dis- 
cover from a man's conversation, what habit 
or feeling it is which usually suggests his 
thoughts ; and when we discover this, we 
may see the reason of much that he says ; 
and often anticipate what opinion he will ex- 
press on a particular subject. 

The actions of animals proceed imme- 
diately from the suggestions which take 
place in their minds ; and these suggestions 



186 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

are caused by their perceptions or sensations. 
The actions of animals, therefore, in given 
circumstances, may generally be antici- 
pated with certainty. The words and 
actions of children chiefly flow, also, from 
the suggestions of the moment : they may, 
therefore, often be anticipated, or, at least 
their words and actions may afterwards be 
accounted for, by our knowledge of the 
suggestions from which they flow. In the 
idle, continued, and multifarious chattering 
of a child, it is often possible to perceive 
chains of suggestions very similar to those 
which take place in dreaming. In proportion 
as the mind by habit becomes active, the 
natural and accidental chains of suggestion 
are interrupted, and words and actions are 
directed by Reason. See Chap. III. 
Syllogism, from cuxXoyia-fjiog — a collection of 
reasons. An inference from what we 
already know or believe to be true, when 
it is put into three propositions is called a 
Syllogism: for example : — 

1. No one can be happy who lives in 
continual fear : 

2. A miser lives in continualfear ; 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 187 

8. Therefore, a miser cannot be happy. 
This is only a more formal way of de- 
claring what must be granted as soon as it 
is stated, — namely, — That a miser cannot 
be happy; because he lives in continual 
fear. 

In a Syllogism, the first two propositions 
are called the Premises ; because they are 
'the things premised or put before ; they are 
also called the Antecedents : the first of 
them is called the Major, and the second 
the Minor. The third proposition, which 
contains the thing to be proved is called the 
Conclusion. 

Reasoning by Syllogism was once sup- 
posed to be the only method of discovering 
truth. It is, in fact, only a method of 
stating formally and distinctly what we 
already know or believe. 
Synthesis, from trvvQsmg — a putting together- 
Synthesis is opposed to Analysis : when the 
parts or elements of any thing have been 
discovered by analysis, we have then learnt 
how to compound them again, so as to 
produce the same complex body : this com- 
pounding is called Synthesis. 



188 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Testimony, is the declaration of one who 
professes to know the truth of that which he 
affirms. By far the greater part of all which 
we believe, and of all which, in a common 
way of speaking 1 , we are said to know, 
depends upon Testimony. Men rely con- 
fidently upon Testimony in conducting their 
most important concerns : and the human 
mind is so formed that it is more natural to 
us to trust to Testimony, than to doubt it. 
We should believe it entirely, and con- 
stantly, if we did not find that it is some- 
times fallacious. 

There are two ways in which Testimony 
may be fallacious : — 1st. He who declares a 
thing may be mistaken : or,— 2nd. He may 
design to deceive those to whom he speaks. 
In judging of the truth of Testimony, we 
must, therefore, in the first place, consider, 
whether it is possible, or likely, that the 
Witness may have been himself deceived in 
the thing which he affirms : for example ; — 
If a Witness declares that he has been 
robbed and beaten on the road ; we know 
that this is a matter in which he cannot be 
mistaken : but if he says that such, or such 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 189 

a man, was the robber, it is possible that in 
this, he may be mistaken ; and if the robbery 
happened after sun-set, it is probable that he 
may be mistaken. We here estimate the 
value of the Testimony by considering the 
nature of the case. 

When it has been thus determined how far 
we may be sure that the Witness is not him- 
self mistaken ; we must next endeavour to 
discover whether he designs to deceive us. 
Now we may judge of the veracity of a 
Witness, in four ways : — - 

1st. By what may be known of his general 
character. This is, indeed, the chief ground 
of our confidence in Testimony. We be- 
lieve a friend, of whose integrity we have 
no doubt, even when he declares what may 
seem highly improbable : while to a known 
liar, we hardly give credit in the most com- 
mon matters. The veracity of men who 
have lived in distant ages may also be judged 
of, where history has recorded the general 
course of their lives ; or where they have 
left writings, by which their principles and 
tempers may be known ; because human 
nature has been the same in all ages. 



190 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

2nd. We judge of the veracity of a Wit- 
ness, by considering whether he is likely to 
be influenced by any motive of interest 
or passion, to give false Testimony, in this 
particular case ; or whether, on the contrary, 
it would not have been to his advantage, to 
have given a very different Testimony. 
When a Witness declares that which brings 
upon himself losses, or dangers, or death, 
his Testimony has the highest kind of con- 
firmation. 

3rd. We may, in general, very safely 
judge of the veracity of a Witness by com- 
paring one part of his narrative with another. 

The several parts of any story which has 
been invented to deceive, will, almost cer- 
tainly, be fouud not to accord with each 
other ; especially in lesser particulars : what 
a false Witness says at one time, will not 
agree with what he says at another : or what 
he says from premeditation, will contradict 
what he affirms when he answers an unex- 
pected question. 

4th The truth may, almost always, be 
discovered, where there is an opportunity 
of comparing the Testimony of different 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 191 

witnesses of the same fact. A number of 
false witnesses will be sure, in some circum- 
stances, to contradict each other ; and 
besides ; — as nothing but some strong 
motive can induce many persons to agree 
together to support the same untruth, it will 
be evident where any such common interest 
exists. But when many witnesses of dif- 
ferent ranks in life, different ages, and 
different private interests, agree in all the 
principal points of a story, we feel confident 
in the truth of the Testimony. 

It is by such methods that the truth of 
Testimony is determined in Courts of law : 
and when a fact proved by Testimony, is 
confirmed by these, or similar rules, no 
reasonable person can honestly pretend to 
doubt it : and, indeed, many criminals are 
adjudged to death where the evidence is very 
far from being satisfactory in all the respects 
which have been mentioned. 

Now, if we apply these four rules to ihe 
Testimony which supports the histories 
contained in the New Testament, we find 
that it is confirmed by each of them. 



192 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

All the principal and most remarkable facts 
in these histories are of such a kind, that it 
is impossible the witnesses should have been 
themselves deceived in what they relate : for 
example, the instantaneous healing of the 
sick ; the restoration of the blind ; the mak- 
ing the maimed whole ; the raising of the 
dead ; the feeding thousands from a few 
loaves ; and all these things done in the pre- 
sence of large assemblies, many of whom 
viewed what was done with envy, and the 
eager desire to find occasion of cavil. No 
one witness in the possession of his faculties, 
could be deceived in such matters ; much 
less, hundreds or thousands of witnesses. 

Then, if we come to judge of the vera- 
city of these witnesses ; there is abundant 
proof, — 

In the first place — that they were honest 
men : not only are the writings which record 
these facts remarkably artless in their style ; 
but their tendency is so plainly favourable to 
virtue, and so strongly opposed to all vice, 
that it is impossible to imagine that the 
writers were themselves wicked men, and 
impostors: such a supposition is far more 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 193 

incredible than that the dead should come 
from their graves ; because this, although it is 
a fact different from what we have ourselves 
ever seen ; yet, it is what we know God can 
do when he pleases ; but the other is con- 
trary to what we know of human nature. 
Nothing can be imagined more strange or 
incredible, than that the very first hook 
that was ever published in the world, con- 
taining a perfect system of morality, — and 
the book which has, in fact, introduced more 
virtue among men, than any other, should 
have been written by impostors. 

In the second place, — it appears, that 
their Testimony constantly brought perse- 
cution upon these Witnesses. We know 
from the Roman Historians, as well as from 
the Writers of the New Testament, that 
many thousand persons, — men, women, 
and children, suffered every misery, and 
the most cruel deaths, solely because they 
persisted in their Testimony. Now, what 
they testified, was not their belief in some 
opinion, in which they might have been 
mistaken ; but they testified that they had 
seen the eyes of the blind opened, the sick 
healed, and the dead raised. Those, there- 

K 



194 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

fore, who first witnessed to the truth of 
Christianity, knowingly brought the worst 
bodily evils upon themselves by so doing. 
Even if it were possible to suppose that a 
few men would act in this way, it is certain 
that multitudes of all nations, many of whom 
were feeble and timid women and children, 
could never be induced to undergo torture 
and death for the sake of affirming what 
they knew to be false. 

In the third place, it appears, that the 
Testimony of the first Christians was 
most sedulously examined. This was in- 
cessantly done by the Jewish and Roman 
Magistrates, who earnestly desired to prove 
that Christianity was a mere delusion ; and 
if there had indeed been any fraud, it would, 
most certainly, have been soon detected and 
brought into disgrace, by the frequent in- 
stances in which the Christians would have 
contradicted their own testimony, given at 
different times, or that of their brethren. 
But, in fact, the enemies of the Christians 
found that it was useless to attempt to deny 
the reality of the miracles wrought by them : 
all they could do was, either to force them 
by torture to renounce their faith, or to 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 195 

put them to death. What has been observed 
concerning the third rule, above mentioned, 
applies also to the fourth. It may be added 
that the truth of the Testimony of the 
first Christians is confirmed by the many 
thousands of idolaters, — the learned as well 
as the ignorant, in every part of the Roman 
Empire, who are known to have become 
Christians in the first century, while miracles 
continued to be wrought in all places, daily. 
The Testimony of the first Christians is also 
confirmed by what is recorded concerning 
their numbers, their sufferings, and their 
constancy, by the heathen historians ; espe- 
cially by Tacitus, Suetonius and Pliny. 

The sum, of what has been said, there- 
fore, is this : — 

I. That the Christian Religion, like all 
the most important concerns of life, requires 
men to rely upon Testimony. 

II. That the Testimony which supports 
the Christian Religion is so satisfactorily 
confirmed, that it cannot be rejected, unless 
we admit many suppositions which are con- 
trary to every thing that we know of human 
nature : whereas, that God should work 
miracles to establish a holy religion, is not 

k2 



196 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

contrary to what we might expect; but per- 
fectly agreeable to our notions of the Divine 
power, and goodness. 

This Testimony of the Apostles and first 
Christians, then, is worthy to be received ; — 

1st. Because, from the nature and ten- 
dency of their writings, the history of their 
lives, and the confession of their enemies, it is 
certain that they were honest and pious men. 

2nd. Because their Testimony brought no 
worldly advantage to themselves, but, on 
the contrary, miseries and death. 

3rd. Because the Jewish and Roman 
Magistrates were unable to detect any con- 
tradiction, fraud, or delusion, among the 
thousands of witnesses whom they examined, 
which they would certainly have done, if real 
miracles had not been wrought. See Belief. 
Theory, is distinguished from Practice : it 
is thinking, not doing. Theory directs 
Practice. 

The word Theory is often used nearly in 
the same sense as the word Hypothesis : 
they may be distinguished thus ; — an Hypo- 
thesis is a guess or supposition, made con- 
cerning the cause of some particular fact, 
with the view of trying experiments, or of 
making observations to discover the truth. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 197 

A Theory is a complete system of suppo- 
sitions, put together for the purpose of 
explaining all the facts that belong to some 
one Science : For example: — 

Astronomers have suggested many Hypo- 
theses, in order to account for the luminous 
stream which follows Comets. They have 
also formed many Theories of the heavens ; 

, or, in other words, — complete explanations 
of all the appearances of the heavenly bodies, 
and their movements. When a Theory has 
been generally received by men of science, 
it is called a System ; — as the Ptolomaic 
System; the Copernican System; the New- 
tonian System, 

Time, is Duration measured into equal parts. 
This measurement is made, either by obser- 
vation of the motions of the heavenly bodies, 
or by the movement of machines. We learn 
to think of Duration chiefly, as it is measured; 
therefore the word Time is more often used 
than the word Duration. See Duration. 
Succession. 

Truth, is the agreement, either of words or 
other signs with the thoughts which they are 
employed to represent; or it is the agree- 
ment of notions with the things to which 
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198 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 



they belong. The word, Truth, therefore, 
expresses nothing more than a relation of 
agreement perceived by the mind. 

The truth of Words or propositions de- 
pends upon the use of words, or forms of 
expression in the sense which they will convey 
to the mind of him with whom we speak. 

With respect to the truth of Notions, an 
important distinction must be made : some 
notions may be perfectly true : others can only 
be imperfectly true : for example; — the notion 
which we may have of a triangle, and all 
its properties, may perfectly agree with that 
mathematical figure. But the notions which 
we have of the works and operations of 
nature, or of our own minds, or of other 
intelligent beings, and especially of the 
Divine Being, can, at best, be only imper- 
fectly true ; because we know scarcely more 
than some few unconnected facts concerning 
these things. The notion which a child has 
of the Moon, who supposes that it is fastened 
in the sky, like a lamp upon a wall, and that 
it is the size of a plate, is altogether false. 
An astronomer's notion of the Moon, is 
true, — but it is imperfectly true : he knows 
its shape, its size, its distance from the 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 199 

Earth, and the laws of its motions ; but this 
is not a thousandth part of what he might 
know if he could he carried thither, and 
remain there some years. Now the first 
business of sound instruction is to free the 
mind from those many false notions which, 
like weeds, spring" up of themselves ; and 
then to impart true notions in their stead. 
The second part of instruction, is to make 
the mind fully aware of the unavoidable 
imperfection of the greater part of all our 
notions. A presumptuous confidence in the 
truth and sufficiency of our notions, is the 
greatest hinderance to the acquirement of 
real knowledge. 

It is not enough to be free from positive 
errors : we ought to know distinctly where 
we are ignorant ; or where knowledge ends. 
This is indispensible, in order that we may 
be at once, humble, and disposed to receive 
further information. The most important 
part of wisdom, in regard to the state of the 
understanding, consists in this knowledge of 
our ignorance. It has been from the want 
of it, that learned men have so often invented 
the most absurd theories to account for the 
appearances of nature, rather than modestly 
k4 



200 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

confess their ignorance. And it is also from 
the want of this sort of wisdom, in matters 
of Religion, that men, who fancy themselves 
wise, refuse to learn what God has been 
pleased to reveal concerning his own nature, 
or his conduct in governing the world : — 
pretending to know, without the light of 
Revelation, what God is, and how he ought 
to act. They thus prove that they do not 
know where they are ignorant: — 'professing 
themselves to be wise, they become fools.' 
However great may be the powers of their 
minds, or their acquirements, they are, in this 
respect, like uneducated persons, whose pre- 
sumption, in matters of science, is worse than 
their mere ignorance, and who generally 
maintain, with the greatest obstinacy, their 
most absurd errors. The proper state of 
the mind, therefore, in regard to the truth of 
its notions consists, — 1st. in not holding false 
notions, when true notions are attainable ; 
and 2nd. in knowing distinctly which of our 
notions are perfectly true, and which are, 
from the nature of the things to which they 
relate, only imperfectly true. 

END OF PART II. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 201 



A SUMMARY, 

EXHIBITING THE CONNEXION AND RELATION OF THE TERMS 
EXPLAINED IN THE PRECEDING VOCABULARY. 



One of the Primary Notions of the Mind, 
resulting from the property which chiefly dis- 
tinguishes Mind from Matter is that of Power. 

The notion of Power suggests the corres- 
pondent notions of Cause, and Effect: and 
those of Liberty, or Contingency ; opposed 
to Necessity. The words Active, and 
Passive, express the state of things to which 
the notions of Cause and Effect are attributed. 

A change produced in the Mind by Material 
causes, through the organs of sense, is called 
Sensation. 

Sensations immediately referred by the Mind 
to external causes are called Perceptions. 

The object of a Perception, recurring to the 
Mind without the actual presence of the material 
cause by which it was first produced, is called 
an Idea. 

The Mind by attributing its Sensations to 
external causes, and by regarding its Percep- 



202 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

tions as proceeding from a source distinct from 
the changes which take place within itself, learns 
to distinguish between Matter, and Mind. 

Matter occasions in the Mind the abstract 
notions expressed by the words Extension, 
Divisibility, Figure, Motion, Solidity, 
(or Resistance, in the different degrees of 
Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, &c.) 

These are called the Primary qualities of 
Matter; distinguished from its Secondary 
qualities, such as Sound, Colour, Taste, 
Smell, Heat ; &e. 

From considering several different qualities 
as united in one body, the Mind comes to make 
the imaginary distinction between Substance, 
and its Modes, or Affections : or, between 
the Subject, and its Adjuncts, Attributes, 
or Accidents. 

And, from the belief that certain qualities 
are constantly and indissolubly joined together, 
results the notion of Essence, or Nature. 

The act of the Mind in recalling Ideas is 
named Conception, 

Ideas are recalled and variously composed 
by an exercise of Imagination. 

The Imagination, when excited by emotions 
of pleasure produces Poetical Invention. 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 203 

The natural or accidental connexions by 
which Ideas are linked together in the Mind 
are termed the Association of Ideas : and 
these Associations, causing a connected and 
continued flow of Ideas through the Mind, re- 
gulate, or indirectly influence Suggestions. 

Ideas occurring along with the notion of a 
past state of the Mind, are said to be retained 
by the faculty of Memory. From Memory re- 
sult the notions of Succession, and Duration, 
or Time. 

The recollection furnished by Memory of a 
continued succession of changes in the Mind 
suggests the reflected notion of self ; called 
Consciousness : the simple abstract notion of 
Being or Existence : and the persuasion of 
Personal Identity. 



The multitude of Ideas which have been de- 
posited in the Mind tend, without any conscious 
effort to fall into sorts or parcels, according to 
the resemblances which exist among them : 
Thus are formed General Notions. General 
Notions are marked and fixed by the use of ar- 
bitrary Signs which are employed as General, 
or Common Terms. 

From this involuntary formation of General 



204 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Notions, and from the use of General Terms, 
the Mind learns to relieve itself from perplexity 
and confusion among the multiplicity of its 
Ideas by Classification; founded upon the 
observation of resemblances and differences : 
hence results the sorting of individuals into 
Genera and Species. 

From the Distinctions upon which such 
classifications are formed result Definitions. 

These artificial operations are signified by the 
word Method : which by Disposition, or Divi- 
sion, and Distribution, produces Order. 

Most Perceptions are multifarious, or com- 
plex ; presenting distinct qualities, variously 
combined, in different objects. Hence the Mind 
is accustomed to regard qualities, either as at- 
tached to some substance, when they are spoken 
of as Concrete ; or separately and singly, by 
an effort of Abstraction. 

Efforts of Abstraction continued in relation 
to a complex object as long as any differences 
are perceived, produce an Analysis. This 
Analysis may be followed by recomposition, 
or Synthesis. 

From the faculty of Abstraction proceeds 
Mechanical Invention ; and from the faculty of 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 205 

Abstraction originate most of those differences 
between Man and inferior Animals which dis- 
tinguish what is called Reason from Instinct. 

Ideas or Notions combined according to the 
connexions or relations which actually exist 
among the objects of them, constitute what is 
called Knowledge. Such combinations, ex- 
pressed in words, and formed into Propositions, 
when compared with the things to which they 
relate, suggest the relative notion of Truth. 

Knowledge, or the perception of the actual 
connexions and relations of things, is accom- 
panied with a pleasurable emotion. When an 
occasion is presented to the Mind of acquiring 
Knowledge, this pleasurable emotion produces 
the state of Mind called Attention. 

The act of the mind in receiving Knowledge 
at the instant when attention begins is called 
Intuition. 

When a longer effort of attention is required, 
in order deliberately to compare objects or 
notions, so as to perceive the relation or con- 
nexion between them, the mind is said to 
exercise Judgement. 

From such comparisons result abstract no- 
tions of Relation, — as the Relations of 



206 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

Sameness, or Difference ; of Agreement, or 
Disagreement ; &c. &c. 

A comparison, when perfected, and ex- 
pressed in words, is called a Proposition. 
Propositions are distinguished as Affirmative, 
or Negative ; Universal, or Particular ; &c. 

A Proposition expressing some relation or 
connexion perceived by Intuition is called an 
Axiom. 

A Proposition perceived to result from, or to 
depend upon some known fact, or some Pro- 
position already proved, is called an Inference. 

The connexion or relation between two facts 
exhibited by a series of Inferences, each de- 
pending upon the one which precedes it, is 
called Reasoning. 

When the connexion or relation between 
facts may be known infallibly, the process of 
Reasoning is called a Demonstration. 

Where the connexion or relation affirmed to 
exist between two facts can not be fully and 
infallibly perceived, the Proposition expressing 
such a connexion is called an Opinion : and the 
intermediate Propositions by means of which 
the connexion of the two facts is endeavoured to 
be proved, are called Arguments; or Reasons. 

Opinions are susceptible of different degrees 



ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 207 

of Probability; according to the nature and 
the amount of the Evidence on which they rest. 
The state of the mind in admitting an opinion 
diners according" to the estimate made of its 
probability; and is either Belief, or Doubt. 

When, (owing to the influence of some im- 
proper motive) Belief is disproportion ed to the 
evidence which has been adduced, such an 
opinion is called a Prejudice. 

A Proposition which affirms an apparent, 
but not a real connexion is a Sophism. 

Uncertain Inferences, deduced from a mere 
resemblance, where the real connexion of facts 
is not known, are said to rest upon Analogy. 

The preceding terms belong chiefly to the 
abstract branches of knowledge. When the 
qualities and changes of material Substances 
are the objects of inquiry, a different set of 
terms is employed. 

The first objects upon which attention is 
fixed, with the view of acquiring knowledge, 
are called Facts. Facts are known by Obser- 
vation, or Testimony. 

Facts from which Inferences are drawn, are 
called Data : or, a Fact noticed with a view to 
philosophical inquiry, is called a Phenomenon. 



208 ELEMENTS OF THOUGHT. 

The collecting of many similar or connected 
Facts, from which some general Inference is 
to be drawn, is called Induction. 

The design of such inquiries is to discover, 
among a multitude of Facts, which are uni- 
formly consequent, the one upon the other, as 
Cause and Effect. 

In order to make these connexions of Cause 
and Effect apparent, and to distinguish them 
from inconstant or accidental connexions, a 
supposition or Hypothesis must be made, 
upon which is founded a trial or Experiment. 

A collection of Hypothesis, relating to the 
same subject is called a Theory. 

A collection of Facts, sorted into pairs or 
series of Causes and Effects, after Induction 
and Experiment, constitutes a Science. 

This knowledge of Causes and Effects, 
when applied to some practical purpose, is 
called an Art. 

When the knowledge of Causes and Effects 
is employed to give a new direction to the 
operations of Nature, the results are said to 
be Artificial. 

the end. 



Primed by Meggy and Chalk, Chelmsford. 



NOV -1 \%k 



CORRECTIONS. 

Page 9, line 12, read, they afford. 

27, — 4, from the bottom, read, complex notions. 

61, — 12, read, Belles Lettres. 

93, — 2, from the bottom, read, ./Eneid. 
144, — 11, read, commit injuries. 
1 /2, last line, read, Upo$. 



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